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POTA: LESSONS LEARNED FROM INDIA’S
ANTI-TERROR ACT
Chris Gagné*
Abstract: Shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United
States, India passed its own anti-terrorism ordinance, the Prevention of
Terrorism Act (POTA), following a terrorist attack on India’s Parliament
building in December 2001. As with the USA PATRIOT Act, Indian
legislators acted quickly, declaring the Act to be a necessary weapon
against terrorism. But POTA, like the USA PATRIOT Act, had detractors,
who criticized the law as unnecessary and draconian. Among other po-
tentially dangerous measures, POTA allowed for 180-day detentions with-
out charge, presumptions of guilt, sketchy review procedures, summary
trials and trials in absentia. In many ways, POTA was harsher than the USA
PATRIOT Act, but then again, so is India’s terrorist threat. In September
2004, a new central government repealed POTA, but other vigorous anti-
terror laws are likely to follow. This Note evaluates the most dangerous
provisions of POTA, how ofªcials abused those provisions, and what
lessons India and the United States can learn from the experience.
Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 sent shockwaves of
fear and insecurity far beyond the borders of the United States. India
in particular had reason to be afraid, and its fear was not merely for
the 250 Indian citizens who were trapped in the burning towers of the
World Trade Center.1 As a nation already at war with terror, it was
clear that the struggle was about to get harder.2 Since gaining inde-
pendence ªfty years ago, India has seen the assassination of its most
prominent civil rights leader, a prime minister, a former prime minis-
                                                                                                                     
* Articles Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2004–2005).
1 See His Excellency Kamlesh Sharma, Permanent Representative of India to the United
Nations on Measures to Eliminate Terrorism (Agenda Item 166) Statement at the Plenary of
the Fifty-sixth Session of the General Assembly ¶ 3 (Oct. 3, 2001), at http://meaindia.
nic.in/disarmament/dm03oct01.htm [hereinafter Measures to Eliminate Terrorism]. See
generally H.E. Atal Behari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of India, Address to the Nation on Terrorist
Attacks on the United States (Sept. 14, 2001), at http://www.indianembassy.org/special/
cabinet/primeminister/pm_september_14_2001.htm [hereinafter Prime Minister’s Address].
2 See Measures to Eliminate Terrorism, supra note 1, ¶ 3. See generally Prime Minister’s
Address, supra note 1.
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ter, and a retired Army chief.3 Moreover, for over ten years, India has
been ªghting insurgents in Kashmir, including Islamic radicals from
Pakistan and Afghanistan.4 As of the fall of 2001, terrorists in Kashmir
had killed thousands of civilians, policemen, and Indian soldiers, and
violence raged on.5 Add to these concerns the continued separatist
violence in India’s northeast, the potential threat of the Tamil Tigers
in the south, and the existence of an organized, international crime
network distributing weapons and explosives to all of the above, and it
is unsurprising that government ofªcials felt compelled to act swiftly
and forcefully in the wake of Al Qaeda’s assault on the United States.6
                                                                                                                     
3 See Robert Payne, The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi 624, 634 (1969) (dis-
cussing assassination of Mahatma Gandhi); M.C. Jain, Introduction: Interim Report on the Jain
Commission of Inquiry on the Assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi, Former Prime Minister of India
on 21st May, 1991 at Sriperumbudur, ¶ 1 (Aug. 1997), available at http://www.india-
today.com/jain/vol5/chap14.html (discussing former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s assas-
sination by a Tamil suicide bomber); Manoj Joshi, Combating Terrorism in Punjab: Indian
Democracy in Crisis, 261 Conºict Stud. 1 (May 1993) (discussing the assassination of a
former Army chief and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi).
4 See The Current Crisis in South Asia: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Middle East and S.
Asia of the Comm. on Int’l Relations H.R., 107th Cong. at 10 (2002) (statement of Michael
Krepon, Founding President, The Henry L. Stimson Center) [hereinafter The Current Crisis
in South Asia]; Embassy of India, 2001–2002 India & the World 8–10, available at
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Foreign_Policy/2002/2002.pdf (last visited Oct. 20,
2004) (presenting ofªcial Indian data on the Jammu and Kashmir conºict). Violence in
the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir has raged for years, gaining particular momentum
in 1989, and no end is in sight. See The Current Crisis in South Asia, supra, at 10–12. Muslim
separatists in the region, allegedly supported by Pakistan, catalyzed three wars between
India and Pakistan, including a brief but intense border conºict in 1999, raising fears in
Washington of a nuclear crisis. Id. at 17 (statement of Amit A. Pandya, Senior Fellow for S.
Asia, Inst. for Global Democracy); India and Pakistan: The Elephant and the Pekinese, Econo-
mist, Mar. 18, 2000, at 25. The violence in Kashmir, combined with the nuclear capabilities
of India and Pakistan prompted President Bill Clinton to declare South Asia “the most
dangerous place in the world.” India and Pakistan: The Elephant and the Pekinese, supra, at 25.
5 See 2003 J&K Militancy Data ( Jammu and Kashmir Dep’t of Info. and Pub. Rel.),
available at http://jammukashmir.nic.in/normalcy/welcome.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2004) (showing thousands killed in Kashmir); Measures to Eliminate Terrorism, supra note
1, ¶¶ 2, 3; K. Santhanam et al., Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery
32 (2003) (showing timeline of terrorist activities following September 11, 2001); Navnita
Chadha Behera, Kashmir: Redeªning the U.S. Role, 110 Brookings Inst. Foreign Pol’y
Stud. Pol’y Brief 2, 2–4 (2002), available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policy
briefs/pb110.htm (discussing terrorist activity post-September 11); John F. Burns, Gunmen
Kill 25 Hindus in Kashmir Attacks, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1998, at A3 (discussing thousands
killed in Kashmir); Tavleen Singh, Striking Terror Whether in the US or Kashmir, It’s Time To
Stop Compromising on Terrorism, India Today, Sept. 24, 2001, at 21, available at 2001 WL
2176651 (discussing terrorist threat in Kashmir on September 11, 2001).
6 See, e.g., Law Commission of India, 173rd Report on Prevention of Terrorism
Bill, 2000 § II 1.5–.9 (2000), reprinted in L.K Thakur, Essentials of POTA and Other
Human Rights Laws 58–60 (2002) (citing over 2000 militant-related deaths in the north-
east region of India during the late 1990s); 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism 10–11,
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India’s Union Cabinet issued the Prevention of Terrorism Ordi-
nance (POTO) in October 2001.7 The central government claimed its
action was a response to “an upsurge of terrorist activities, in-
tensiªcation of cross border terrorism, and insurgent groups in dif-
ferent parts of the country.”8 The ordinance granted state law en-
forcement sweeping powers to investigate, detain, and prosecute for a
wide range of terrorist-related offenses.9 Most notably, POTO targeted
those who allegedly incited, supported, abetted, harbored, concealed,
or beneªted from the proceeds of terrorism.10
To some, POTO bore an ominous resemblance to the notorious
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (hereinafter TADA),
which lapsed in 1995 after years of abuse.11 Despite some initial criti-
cism, however, events in India soon made POTO an apparent neces-
sity to the ruling coalition and many other legislators.12 On December
13, 2001, Muslim terrorists, allegedly backed by Pakistan, attacked the
Indian parliament in a failed attempt to assassinate legislators.13 The
                                                                                                                     
(U.S. Dept. of State), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10319.
pdf (citing various terrorist threats in India); Jain, supra note 3, ¶ 1 (discussing the Tamil
Tigers); Thakur, supra, at 1–3 (discussing the rising threat of organized crime and arms
trafªcking). The Tamil Tigers (also known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE))
is a notoriously violent Sri Lankan separatist group that was responsible for the assassina-
tion of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. See Jain, supra note 3, ¶ 1.
7 Thakur, supra note 6, at xii.
8 South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, Prevention of Terrorism
Ordinance 2001: Government Decides to Play Judge and Jury 13 (2001) (quoting
Union Home Ministry).
9 See South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 5–9.
10 Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001, § 3(1)–(8), reprinted in South Asia Hu-
man Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 40–41 (2001).
11 See South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 15; Tha-
kur, supra note 6, at 4; TADA in New Garb, Tribune (India), Oct. 18, 2001, ¶ 1, available at
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20011018/edit.htm#1.
12 See South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 2–3; 11
Killed in Attack on Parliament, Tribune (India), Dec. 13, 2001, available at
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20011213/main8.htm (reporting terrorist attack on
India’s Parliament on December 13, 2001); Jyotsna Singh, India Launches Anti-Terror Law,
BBC News, ¶ 2 (Oct. 25, 2001), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/
1619870.stm (reporting criticism of POTO); TADA in New Garb, supra note 11, ¶ 1 (criticiz-
ing POTO). In response to a terrorist attack on India’s Parliament on December 13, 2001,
the Union Cabinet declared, “[w]e will liquidate the terrorists and their sponsors wherever
they are, whoever they are. . . . The assault is yet another reminder that each of us must
measure the issue we take up against the challenge that confronts the country.” Union
Cabinet of India, Resolution on the Terrorist Attack on Parliament House, ¶ 1 (Dec. 13,
2001), at http://www.indianembassy.org/new/parliament_dec_13_01.htm [hereinafter
Union Cabinet of India].
13 See H.E. Lal Krishna Advani, Indian Home Minister, Statement on the Terrorist At-
tack on Parliament House, ¶¶ 1, 2 (Dec. 18, 2001), at http://www.indianembassy.org/
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Cabinet condemned the attack as targeting “the very heart of our sys-
tem of governance, on what is the symbol and the keystone of the
largest democracy in the world.”14 Three months later, during a rare
joint session convened at the Prime Minister’s request, the temporary
ordinance became the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA).15
After the legislature passed POTA in March of 2002, the Indian
media and human rights groups observed and criticized frequent
abuses of the law, including hundreds of questionable and prolonged
detentions with no formal charges ªled.16 The most visible of these
involved political ªgures arrested by rivals in control of state law en-
forcement machinery.17 Most abuses arising in the form of prolonged
detention without charges, however, went unreported, as the targets
were often members of disempowered minorities lacking a forum in
which to voice the mistreatment.18 Detainees languished in jail for
weeks or months while the wheels of India’s overburdened criminal
                                                                                                                     
new/parliament_dec_13_01.htm; Parliament Suicide Attack Stuns India, BBC News (Dec. 13,
2001), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1708853.stm.
14 Union Cabinet of India, supra note 12, ¶ 1.
15 Two Pak-Backed Outªts Banned Under POTA, Tribune (India), Apr. 1, 2002, available at
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020402/nation.htm#1. See generally Prevention of
Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15 (India), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 7–52. This Note
refers to provisions and criticism of POTO interchangeably with those of POTA, because
they are nearly identical.
16 See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Abuse of the Law in Gujarat: Muslims Detained Ille-
gally in Ahmedabad 1–2 (Nov. 6, 2003), available at http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/ai
doc_pdf.nsf/Index/ASA200292003ENGLISH/$File/ASA2002903.pdf (discussing illegal
detention of Muslim minority and disregard for POTA safeguards) [hereinafter Abuse of
the Law in Gujarat]; Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights
Abuses Worldwide, Brieªng Paper for the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights 15 (Mar. 25, 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-
bck.pdf (discussing detention of political ªgures, children, and the elderly) [hereinafter In
the Name of Counter-Terrorism]; George Iype, Terrorising the Politicians, Rediff.com (India),
¶¶ 2, 10 (Aug. 14, 2002), at http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/aug/14spec.htm (citing
257 POTA arrests across India as of August 2002, including the arrest of a Tamil Nadu
politician).
17 See Ajay Uprety, Playing a Crafty Game: Mayawati Kicks Both Friend and Foe on the Shin,
Week (India), ¶¶ 10–14 (Feb. 9, 2003), at http://www.the-week.com/23feb09/events9.htm
(discussing political detainees in the state of Uttar Pradesh); Purnima S. Tripathi, Coalition
Troubles, Frontline (India), Mar. 1–14, 2003, ¶¶ 3–5, available at http://www.front
lineonnet.com/º2005/stories/20030314004204000.htm (discussing political detentions in
Uttar Pradesh); Selective Use of POTA, Hindu (India), Apr. 1, 2003, ¶¶ 1, 2, available at
http://www.hinduonet.com/thehindu/2003/04/01/stories/2003040100391000.htm (discuss-
ing political detentions in the states of Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh).
18 See Abuse of the Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–2; In the Name of Counter-
Terrorism, supra note 16, at 15–16; Manoj Prasad, A 14-Year-Old Tells You What POTA Means to
the Poor, Indian Express, Mar. 29, 2003, ¶¶ 1, 6, 7, 8, 11, available at http://www.indianex-
press.com/full_story.php?content_id=21041.
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justice system creaked slowly along.19 Despite the existence of special
courts to expedite the process, at least in theory, they did little to
counter POTA’s permissive stance on such lengthy incarcerations.20
Provisions for oversight were similarly impotent.21 Some of these prob-
lems stemmed from the law’s broad text, while others were rooted in
its enforcement.22
In September 2004, a new central government repealed POTA,
but other vigorous anti-terror laws are likely to follow.23 India’s expe-
rience under POTA is a cautionary tale from which both Indian and
U.S. lawmakers might learn. This Note examines how certain provi-
sions of POTA lent themselves to abuse and suggests ways to avoid
similar abuses in future anti-terror laws, wherever they may be written
and applied. Part I of this Note describes the tools India used prior to
POTA to combat terrorist threats throughout the country. Provisions
of POTA that are particularly susceptible to abuse are examined in
Part II. Part III focuses on how law enforcement ofªcials and politi-
cians misused or abused POTA during the past two years, particularly
with improper arrests, prolonged detentions, and ineffective over-
sight. Part IV examines how the Indian government can avoid some of
POTA’s shortcomings in the future. Finally, Part V considers the les-
sons the United States can and should draw from India’s experience
with POTA.
                                                                                                                     
19 See Abuse of the Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–2; In the Name of Counter-
Terrorism, supra note 16, at 15–16; Prasad, supra note 18, ¶¶ 1, 6, 7, 8, 11.
20 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15 (India), §§ 23, 29, 49, reprinted in
Thakur, supra note 15, at 23–27, 43–45.
21 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, §§ 24 (2)–(3), 34, 40, 60 reprinted in Thakur, supra
note 6, at 25–26, 31–32, 36, 48–49 (establishing review procedures); Abuse of the Law in
Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–2 (discussing prolonged detention, torture, and disregard of
POTA safeguards). See generally V. Venkatesan, POTA Prospects, Frontline (India), Mar. 30-
Apr. 12, 2002, available at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/º1907/19070220.htm (discuss-
ing POTA’s safeguards) [hereinafter POTA Prospects].
22 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, §§ 3–5, 49, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 43–
44 (broadly deªning terrorist offenses and permitting prolonged detention without
charge); Abuse of the Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–2 (discussing prolonged de-
tention, torture, and disregard of POTA safeguards); In the Name of Counter-Terrorism, supra
note 16, at 15 (discussing ineffectiveness of POTA safeguards as applied).
23 See J. Venkatesan, President’s Nod for Ordinance to Repeal POTA, Sept. 21, 2004, Hindu
(India), ¶1, available at http://www.hindu.com/2004/09/22/stories/2004092207420100.
htm. In addition to repealing POTA, the Indian government passed an ordinance to amend
an existing law to replace POTA. See V. Venkatesan, POTA Reinvented, Frontline (India),
Oct. 23–Nov. 5, 2004, ¶5 available at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/º2122/stories/
20041105004811000.htm. The amended law immediately drew criticism for not doing
enough to solve POTA’s problems. See id.
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I. POTA in Context: Fighting Terror on the Subcontinent
POTA was only India’s latest tool in combating the continually
evolving terrorist threat, which has emerged in several parts of the
country since its independence from Great Britain in 1947. One of
India’s earliest terrorist experiences is also one of its most notorious:
the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi by a Hindu extremist on Janu-
ary 31, 1948.24 Subsequent terrorist attacks involved large and persis-
tent regional groups ªghting for secession.25 As a large, multi-ethnic,
post-colonial nation still in development, India is particularly vulner-
able to violent political movements predicated upon geography, eth-
nicity, language, and religion.26
To preserve public order and national security, India’s Constitu-
ent Assembly drafted the Constitution of India to grant explicitly to
state and federal legislatures the power to enact laws providing for
preventative detention.27 This practice involves incarcerating indi-
viduals based upon the suspicion that such individuals may commit a
crime in the future.28 Both central and state governments incorpo-
rated preventative detention provisions—albeit subject to certain con-
stitutional safeguards—in several pieces of legislation throughout In-
dia’s turbulent history. For example, during a decade of gruesome
terrorist violence in the State of Punjab, the central government
passed the National Security Act (NSA) and TADA, both of which
permitted preventative detentions under broadly deªned condi-
tions.29 Similarly, in Jammu and Kashmir, the state government passed
                                                                                                                     
24 See Payne, supra note 3, at 618, 633–34.
25 Law Commission of India, § II 1.5–.9, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 56–60
(discussing terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and northeastern India); Jain, supra
note 3, ¶1 (discussing the Tamil Tigers).
26 See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2004, 249 (2003)
[hereinafter World Factbook]; Peter Heehs, Nationalism, Terrorism, Communalism:
Essays in Modern India 135 (1998); Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy:
The Liberal State Response 24 (2002). Although liberal democracies are intrinsically
vulnerable to terrorism, developing countries are most at risk of terrorist violence erupting
into civil wars. Wilkinson, supra, at 25. International relations scholar Paul Wilkinson
warns that “[i]t is absurdly parochial and dangerously misleading to pretend that terrorism
is solely of concern to rich Western democracies. It is a far graver threat to human rights
and well-being in the emerging democracies of the ‘Third’ and ‘Second’ worlds.” Id. at 24.
27 See India Const., pt. III, art. 22(7), pt. XXI, art. 373; Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of
an Institutionalized Emergency: Preventative Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 Mich. J.
Int’l L. 311, 324–25 (2001).
28 See India Const., pt. III, art. 22(7), pt. XXI, art. 373; Jinks, supra note 27, at 324–25.
29 See National Security Act, 1980, § 3(2), reprinted in D.S. Shukla, The Prevention of
Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA) 383 (2002); Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1987, No. 28, § 7(1), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 217; Kshitij Prabha, Ter-
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the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act of 1978 (PSA), which con-
tained equally harsh preventative detention provisions.30 Although
several preventative detention laws have since expired, the NSA and
PSA remain operative.31
In extreme cases, the Indian government has employed the mili-
tary to combat terrorism. The Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur)
Special Powers Act of 1958 allowed the state governor of Assam and
Manipur to declare all or part of the state a “Disturbed Area,” wherein
military ofªcers had discretion to kill armed individuals or groups
and to conduct searches and arrests without warrants.32 The Indian
                                                                                                                     
rorism: An Instrument of Foreign Policy 78–79, 90 (2001) (discussing terrorist vio-
lence in Punjab and remedial legislation); Joshi, supra note 3, at 1 (discussing separatist
violence in Punjab). The government passed many other anti-terrorism laws in Punjab in
addition to the NSA and TADA. Prabha, supra, at 90. TADA permits the central govern-
ment to confer upon police within any state the power to arrest people “for the prevention
of, and for coping with, any offence” listed in the sweeping statute, including many that
merely involve speech. Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, §§ 4, 7(1),
reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 214–17. The NSA permits police to detain a person
virtually indeªnitely in order to “prevent[] him from acting in any manner prejudicial to
the security of the state government or . . . the maintenance of public order or . . . the
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.” National Security Act,
§§ 2(2)–(3), reprinted in Shukla, supra, at 383. Though harsh, the provisions for preventa-
tive detention are somewhat understandable given the extent of violence in Punjab at the
time of their passage. See Joshi, supra note 3, at 1. Terrorist atrocities in Punjab included
the mass murder of minority Hindus, train shootings, bombings, kidnappings, and be-
headings. See id. at 8, 11; Prabha, supra, at 79. Disturbingly, the Indian Army and police
forces were themselves responsible for excessive and indiscriminate violence and custodial
killings. See Joshi, supra note 3, at 6, 12, 14–15; Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, Fighting
for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants 10 (1996); Joyce J.M. Petti-
grew, Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence 104
(1995).
30 See Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA) (1978), § 8, Human Rights Centre,
Queen’s University Belfast, available at http://www.law.qub.ac.uk/humanrts/emergency/
india/ind5.htm (as of Oct. 20, 2004). Under the PSA, police need no court order to detain
individuals as punishment or to prevent them from “acting in any manner prejudicial to the
security of the state or the maintenance of public order.” Id.; see also Human Rights Watch,
Behind the Kashmir Conºict: Abuses by Indian Security Forces and Militant Groups Continue, ¶¶ 10,
16 ( July 1999), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/kashmir/judiciary.htm (citing several
instances where the law was abused) [hereinafter Behind the Kashmir Conºict].
31 Jinks, supra note 27, at 327. See J&K Panel Reviews Cases of Public Safety Act Detainees,
Hindu (India), Jan. 30, 2004, ¶ 1, available at http://www.hindu.com/2004/ 01/30/sto
ries/2004013003731200.htm.
32 Armed Forces (Assam & Manipur) Special Powers Act (1958), No. 28 (India), §§ 3, 4,
available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/
armed_forces_special_power_act_1958.htm (as of Apr. 17, 2004).
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government later invoked variants of this law in both Punjab and
Jammu and Kashmir.33
Thus, given its history of turbulence, it is not surprising that In-
dia’s latest anti-terror law was more ruthless than its U.S. counterpart.34
POTA was more moderate, however, than India’s prior national security
laws.35 It neither involved the military nor provided explicitly for pre-
ventative detention, although it did resurrect large portions of TADA.36
Other provisions, however, such as those permitting prolonged deten-
tions with minimal judicial oversight, were virtually as dangerous.37
                                                                                                                     
33 The Armed Forces ( Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act (1990), No. 21 of 1990,
available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/documents/acts
andordinances/J&K_Specialpoweract.htm (as of Apr. 17, 2004); Prabha, supra note 29, at
90.
34 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [here-
inafter USA PATRIOT Act]; Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15 (India), §§ 29, 49,
53, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 27–28, 43–44, 46–47; South Asia Human Rights
Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 5–9 (citing broad terrorist offenses based on
speech and association, presumptions of guilt based on certain evidence, special anti-
terror courts, trials in absentia, detention without charge for up to 180 days, and severe
bail restrictions).
35 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, §§ 29, 49, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 27–
28, 43–44 (stipulating arrest and detention procedures that do not include preventative
detention); Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, No. 28 (India),
§§ 4, 7(1), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 214–17 (stipulating criminal offenses and
permitting preventative detention); National Security Act, 1980, § 3(2)–(3), reprinted in
Shukla, supra note 29, at 383 (providing for preventative detention); Armed Forces (As-
sam & Manipur) Special Powers Act, 1958, No. 28 (India), §§ 3, 4, supra note 32 (providing
for military intervention).
36 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, §§ 3(1), (3)–(5), 16(1)–(2), reprinted in Thakur,
supra note 6, at 10–12 (identifying various terrorist offenses and penalties similar to
TADA); Terrorist Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, §§ 3(1), (3), (5), 8(1)–(2), re-
printed in Thakur, supra note 6, at 214–18 (identifying various terrorist offenses and penal-
ties including preventative detention similar to POTA).
37 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 49(2), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 43–44;
South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 4 (arguing that
POTA’s detention provisions are illegitimate and “subvert the cardinal rule of the criminal
justice system by placing the burden on the accused”); Human Rights Watch, 14 “We Have
No Orders to Save You” State Participation and Complicity in Communal Violence in Gujarat 14−15
(Apr. 2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/india/gujarat.pdf [hereinafter
“We Have No Orders to Save You”]; Mukhtar Ahmad, Yasin Malik Rearrested After Getting Bail in
Pota Case, Rediff.com (India), ¶¶ 1, 2, 4 ( July 20, 2002), at http://www.rediff.com/
news/2002/jul/20jk1.htm (reporting that after being granted bail under POTA, police
rearrested Kashmiri political activist Yasin Malik under a preventative detention law for
“anti-national activities,” which suggests that the laws are used interchangeably).
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II. POTA in Print
A. Broad Deªnitions of Terrorism
Many of POTA’s ºaws stemmed from its broad text.38 While all
laws may be susceptible to abuse, anti-terror legislation in particular
invites it by placing permissive language in the hands of zealous law
enforcement ofªcers.39 The USA PATRIOT Act, like POTA, deªnes
terrorism crimes broadly, but POTA’s deªnitions are even less pre-
cise.40 POTA deªned terrorism as any violence “with intent to
threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to
strike terror in the people or any section of the people.”41 Moreover,
the law imposed a minimum ªve-year sentence on “[w]hoever con-
spires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites or
knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act pre-
paratory to a terrorist act . . . .”42
Particularly troublesome were the words “advocates” and “incites,”
for they implicated issues of free speech and political expression.43 The
same problems arose under section 21 of POTA, which made it an of-
                                                                                                                     
38 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, §§ 3, 21, 49(2), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at
10–12, 21, 43–44 (providing broad deªnitions of terrorist offenses and prolonged deten-
tion); Abuse of the Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–2.
39 See Michael Freeman, Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democra-
cies Using Emergency Powers to Fight Terror 1–3 (2003).
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2003); Prevention of Terrorism Act, §§ 3, 21 reprinted in Tha-
kur, supra note 6, at 10–12; South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra
note 8, at 43 (discussing the broad deªnition of terrorism in POTO, which is identical to the
deªnition in POTA); Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
767, 789 (2002) (discussing the broad deªnition of terrorism in the USA PATRIOT Act). The
PATRIOT Act’s deªnition of terrorism includes already criminalized “violent acts or acts
dangerous to human life” that “appear to be intended” to “intimidate or coerce a civilian
population” or “to inºuence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion. 18
U.S.C. § 2331(5). Under this legal framework even protests—occasionally violent, sometimes
illegal, but always intended to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population” and/or to
“inºuence the policy of a government”—might become subject to governmental surveillance
or arrest under this deªnition. See Lobel, supra, at 789; Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door:
Balancing National Security with Privacy Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 80 Denv. U. L. Rev. 375,
410 (2002).
41 Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 3(1), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 10.
42 Id. § 3(3), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 11.
43 See id.; South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 5
(observing that the terms “advocates” and “incites” criminalize mere association or com-
munication with terrorists); Supreme Court Upholds POTA, Vaiko May Get Some Relief, Hindu
(India), Dec. 17, 2003, available at http://www.hindu.com/2003/12/17/stories/
2003121704620100.htm (Supreme Court’s statement that POTA should not be interpreted
as criminalizing mere speech).
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fense for one to “invite[] support for a terrorist organization” or “ad-
dress[] a meeting for the purpose of encouraging support for a terror-
ist organization . . . .”44 POTA did more, however, than create broad
new crimes under the rubric of terrorism.45 Like the PATRIOT Act,
POTA deªned terrorist acts in generalized terms that encompassed or-
dinary cases of murder, robbery, theft, and comparable offenses.46
Thus, its violators could have been subject to improperly severe penal-
ties and overzealous law enforcement ofªcials attempting to circumvent
constitutionally-mandated procedural safeguards.47
B. Sweeping Powers of Arrest and Detention
POTA’s broad deªnitions of terrorist offenses were especially
problematic in light of its modiªed arrest and detention procedures
and special terrorism courts.48 Section 49(2) of POTA allowed police
to detain a suspect for up to 180 days without a formal charge, far ex-
ceeding the limit under ordinary Indian criminal law.49 Although the
Indian Constitution requires police to promptly inform a person of
the grounds for his or her detention and to provide the “earliest op-
portunity to make a representation” before a magistrate,50 and Indian
case law identiªes a speedy trial as “an integral and essential part of
the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in [the Constitu-
tion],”51 POTA managed to dramatically undermine these safeguards
against the arbitrary and punitive detention of innocents.52
                                                                                                                     
44 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 21(1), (3), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at
21–22.
45 See id. § 3(1), (3), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 10–11.
46 See id. §§ 3, 4, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6; In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, (U.S.F-I-
S-Ct. of R - 2002) (discussing enhanced surveillance of criminal investigations under USA
PATRIOT Act); Heath H. Galloway, Note, Don’t Forget What We’re Fighting For: Will the Fourth
Amendment Be a Casualty of the War on Terror?, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 921, 967–70 (2002)
(arguing that the government could circumvent constitutional protections for ordinary
criminal investigations under the USA Patriot Act).
47 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, §§ 3, 4, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 10–13;
South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 5.
48 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, §§ 23, 49(2), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at
23–24, 43–44.
49 See id. § 49(2), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 43–44; South Asia Human
Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 87.
50 See India Const., pt. III, art. 22(2), (5); South Asia Human Rights Documenta-
tion Centre, supra note 8, at 87.
51 Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 S.C.C. 81, at 89,
quoted in South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 87.
52 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 49(2), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, 43–44;
South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 87. In some cases,
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Stringent bail procedures further frustrated the rights of the ac-
cused.53 The POTA court could postpone bail petitions for a year.54
Furthermore, if the prosecutor opposed bail, the court could not re-
lease the accused without “grounds for believing that he is not guilty
. . . .”55 This provision reversed the presumption of innocence at the
bail hearing and effectively granted the prosecutor a veto of the bail
application.56 The presumption of guilt extended even further be-
yond the bail procedures. In effect, POTA mandated a presumption
of guilt for those accused of terrorist activities, if the accused unlaw-
fully possessed arms or explosives or if his or her ªngerprints were
found at the scene of the alleged offense.57
C. Appeal and Review
POTA did, however, have some safeguards. Either party could
appeal a bail ruling or verdict from a Special Court to a bench of two
judges of the High Court of the same jurisdiction.58 On appeal, a
court could review both issues of fact and law.59 No guidelines existed,
however, as to who the reviewing judge would be.60 Even more prob-
lematic was the non-reviewability of orders by the Special Court
passed at the interlocutory stage.61
The central government initially defended POTA as being safe
from abuse because it entrusted only senior law enforcement and judi-
cial functionaries with the most extensive investigative and adjudicative
authority.62 Because POTA operated at the state level, however, state
                                                                                                                     
however, a trial might have been speedier than a defendant would have liked. See Preven-
tion of Terrorism Act, § 29(2), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 45. Once a case ªnally
reached the court, the magistrate could choose to try any offense summarily and without
argument from the accused if it was punishable by no more than three years in prison. Id.
Neither the accused nor a representative thereof needed even be present. Id. The provi-
sion, however, limited sentencing from summary trials to a year in prison. Id.
53 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 49 (6)–(7), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at
45; South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 89.
54 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 49 (6)–(7), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at
45.
55 See id. § (7), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 45.
56 See id.; South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 89.
57 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 53(1), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 46–47;
South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 92.
58 Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 34, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 31.
59 Id.
60 See id.
61 See id; South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 83.
62 POTA Prospects, supra note 21, ¶¶ 12, 13.
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governments wielded tremendous power over state law enforcement
ofªcials, regardless of their seniority.63
In a cursory attempt to check this power, legislators provided for a
central review committee with some oversight authority.64 Although
POTA’s text provided for a review committee, an absence of interpre-
tive guidelines led to considerable confusion.65 The government’s ini-
tial interpretation limited the provision’s application to the primarily
advisory review of certain surveillance procedures and the designa-
tion of terrorist groups.66 Only after reports of widespread POTA
abuses proliferated throughout India did the central government se-
lect certain cases for further review.67 A formal amendment in De-
cember 2003 gave the review committee the ability to review prima
facie cases and made its decisions binding on POTA courts.68 Still,
                                                                                                                     
63 See V. Venkatesan, Reform Without Rationale, Frontline (India), Nov. 8–12, 2002, ¶¶ 1,
8, 10, available at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/º2023/stories/20031121005902200.htm
[hereinafter Reform Without Rationale].
64 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, §§ 19(4)–(7), 46, 60, reprinted in Thakur, supra
note 6, at 20–21, 40–41, 48–49; Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶¶ 2, 3, 4 (discuss-
ing POTA’s central review committee).
65 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, §§ 19(4)–(7), 46, 60, reprinted in Thakur, supra
note 6, at 20–21, 40–41, 48–49; Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 3.
66 See Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 4, 5.
67 See Amending POTA: Welcome Decision, Belated Though, Tribune (India), Oct. 23, 2003,
¶ 2, available at http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20031023/edit.htm#1; Reform Without
Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 6. Reported abuses included the detention of politicians,
women, children, and the elderly. See N.C. Bipindra, A Handy Weapon to Settle Political Scores
in Jaya’s State, Indian Express, Mar. 31, 2003, ¶¶ 1, 2, 6, available at http://www.indianex
press.com/full_story.php?content_id=21149 (reporting that the Tamil Nadu government
arrested a fourteen-year-old boy and politicians); Prasad, supra note 18, ¶¶ 1, 10 (reporting
that Jharkhand police arrested a fourteen-year-old boy, a ªfteen-year-old boy, and ªve
women); Rising Abuse of POTA, Tribune (India), Mar. 7, 2003, ¶ 1, available at http://
www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030307/edit.htm#2 (reporting that Jharkhand police ar-
rested twelve juveniles and an eighty-one-year-old.). After the Tamil Nadu state govern-
ment arrested a political opponent with ties to the central government, the center estab-
lished a review commission to investigate the charges. See A. Subramani, POTA Panel Order
Challenged, Hindu (India), Jan. 28, 2004, ¶ 1, available at http://www.hindu.com/2004/
01/28/stories/2004012812650400.htm. In October, Indian President Abdul Kalam passed an
ordinance making the review commission’s decisions binding on the states. J. Venkatesan,
Ordinance to Amend POTA Promulgated, Hindu (India), Oct. 28, 2003, ¶ 1, available at
http://www.hindu.com/2003/10/28/stories/ 2003102808990100.htm. At the very least, the
review committee has the authority to review whether or not a state government has made a
prima facie case under POTA. See Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 8.
68 Lok Sabha Passes Bill to Amend Terror Law, 1 Indian Dig. 2, ¶¶ 1, 2 (Dec. 2003), at
http://www.indianembassy.org/i_digest/2003/dec_02/terror_bill.htm.
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much ambiguity remained, and the central review committee contin-
ued to lack both resources and timelines.69
III. POTA as Applied
The states that enacted POTA wasted no time in capitalizing on its
broad deªnitions of terrorist offenses and sweeping powers of arrest
and detention.70 Warning signs of POTA’s susceptibility to abuse
surfaced in the summer of 2002.71 Only four months after its effective
date, state law enforcement ofªcers had arrested 250 people nationwide
under the Act, and the number was steadily increasing.72 A mere eight
months later, , the seven states applying POTA had arrested over 940
people, at least 560 of whom were languishing in jail.73 The law’s
application was also erratic, varying from state to state in surprising
ways.74
The State of Jharkhand in particular appeared to have detained
more people under POTA than even terror-plagued Jammu and
Kashmir, which had witnessed some of India’s most violent insurgency
for over ten years.75 Jharkhand gained particular notoriety for arrest-
ing women, children, and the elderly, even as a High Court in Tamil
Nadu decided that police could not arrest juveniles under POTA.76 A
                                                                                                                     
69 See Rajeev Dhavan, Opinion, Sugarcoating POTA, Hindu (India), Oct. 31, 2003,
¶¶ 10, 11, available at http://www.hindu.com/2003/10/31/stories/2003103100841000.
htm; Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶¶ 8, 11.
70 See Iype, supra note 16, ¶¶ 1, 2, 16.
71 See id. ¶¶ 1–4.
72 Id. ¶¶ 1, 2.
73 Rakesh Sinha & Kavita Chowdhury, POTA Fact: Jharkhand Has a Lot More Terror Than
J-K, Indian Express, Mar. 28, 2003, ¶ 8 graphic, available at http://www.indianexpress.
com/full_story.php?content_id=20985.
74 See id.
75 See id; Akshaya Mukul, Jharkhand, J&K Send POTA Lists, Times of India, Jan. 17, 2004,
¶¶ 2, 4, available at http://timesoªndia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/428500.cms; Iype, supra
note 16, ¶¶ 1, 2, 16. By March 2003, Jharkhand had accused over 700 people under POTA.
Sinha & Chowdhury, supra note 73, ¶ 8 graphic. The total number of those accused under
POTA in Jammu and Kashmir is unclear because many were unidentiªed. Id. However,
Jharkhand had arrested 207 people while Jammu and Kashmir had arrested 168. Id. As of
January 17, 2004, the Indian Home Ministry estimated that Jharkhand had 130 in jail under
POTA while Jammu and Kashmir had more than it had reported, but still less than Jhark-
hand. Mukul, supra, ¶¶ 2, 4.
76 See Bipindra, supra note 67, ¶¶ 1, 2; (reporting that the Madras High Court set
aside a POTA charge against a ªfteen-year-old boy); Inder Malhotra, The Use and Misuse
of POTA, Hindu (India), Oct. 10, 2003, ¶ 9, available at http:// www.hindu.com/2003/
10/10/stories/2003101005721200.htm (reporting that Jharkhand police arrested school
girls); Prasad, supra note 18, ¶¶ 1, 10 (reporting that Jharkhand police arrested a fourteen-
year-old boy, a ªfteen-year-old boy, and ªve women); Rising Abuse of POTA, supra note 67, ¶ 1
(reporting that Jharkhand police arrested twelve juveniles and an eighty-one-year-old).
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year after Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani had assured Parliament
that POTA would not be abused, he ªnally conceded that evidence of
the misuse of POTA was “serious enough” to warrant review.77
Although Jharkhand’s application of POTA was unexpected,
other states abused the law in more predictable ways.78 Both commu-
nalism and political gamesmanship have a long and sordid history in
India.79 POTA’s opponents warned that ofªcials would use the law to
target minorities and political opponents.80 Their fears were soon re-
alized.81
Misuse of POTA along communal and minority lines was most
glaring in Gujarat.82 In Gujarat, police invoked POTA to arrest 123
Muslims allegedly involved in a vicious attack on a train full of Hindu
passengers. The government declined, however, to use POTA against
                                                                                                                     
77 See Sinha & Chowdhury, supra note 73, ¶¶ 1, 2.
78 See Iype, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 5, 6, 10, 11, 13 (discussing politicians harassed under
POTA); Malhotra, supra note 76, ¶¶ 2–5, 7 (discussing use of POTA to detain politicians);
Uprety, supra note 17, ¶¶ 10–12 (discussing detention of political ªgures in Uttar
Pradesh).
79 See Smita Narula, Overlooked Danger: The Security and Rights Implications of Hindu Na-
tionalism in India, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 41, 67–68 (2003); Joshi, supra note 3, at 2; Ven-
kitesh Ramakrishnan, The Bengal Battle, Frontline (India), Sep. 30−Oct. 13, 2000, ¶ 13,
available at http://www.ºonnet.com/º1720/17200300.htm (discussing political games-
manship involving anti-terror legislation in West Bengal). As early as 1939, the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a right-wing Hindu nationalist group still active in India,
adopted Nazi propaganda to promote Hindu fascism. See Narula, supra, at 43–44. When
POTA was passed in 2002, the head of India’s central coalition government, and champion
for the Act, was the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the political wing of a family of Hindu
nationalist organizations, which includes the RSS. See id. at 42, 44; POTA Prospects, supra
note 21, ¶ 1. Hindu nationalist groups like the RSS have long exploited communal ten-
sions in India for their own political ends. See Narula, supra, at 42.
80 See Iype, supra note 16, ¶¶ 15–18; POTA Prospects, supra note 21, ¶ 26. Members of
India’s opposition Congress Party decried that the law can be misused to settle political
scores and engage in “political witch-hunting.” Iype, supra note 16, ¶ 18.
81 See Iype, supra note 16, ¶¶ 5, 7, 9 (reporting on politicians targeted by POTA); Mal-
hotra, supra note 76, ¶¶ 8–10 (discussing POTA’s use against politicians, indigent school-
girls, and Muslim minorities); Uprety, supra note 17, ¶¶ 10–14 (discussing harassment of
political opposition in Uttar Pradesh).
82 See Abuse of the Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–2; Stavan Desai, In Gujarat,
Only Godhra Case Is Fit Enough for POTA, Indian Express, Apr. 3, 2003, ¶ 1, available at
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=21360; Narula, supra note 79,
at 48–49. In March 2002, the government accused sixty-four people allegedly involved in
the train massacre, but withdrew the POTA charges—-amidst heavy criticism of biased
application—-claiming that the required formalities had not been completed. See Desai,
supra, ¶ 3. Eleven months later, after criticism died down, police arrested 123 people un-
der POTA for the same incident claiming that they had new evidence based on a confes-
sion by one of the accused. Id. ¶ 4.
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Hindus involved in pogroms that killed over 2,000 Muslims.83 Shortly
after the pogroms, Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi justiªed the
government’s choice by simply stating that it was unnecessary to invoke
POTA against the Hindu rioters.84 The state government characterized
the violence as a “spontaneous reaction” to the train attack, despite evi-
dence that the riots had been organized by right-wing Hindu groups.85
Gujarat police later used POTA to arrest Muslims allegedly involved in
a post-riot reprisal against a former state ofªcial, claiming that investi-
gations had “uncovered a major conspiracy . . . to strike terror in the
minds of a particular section of people.”86 POTA’s text and the state’s
justiªcations for prosecuting Muslims under the law supported charges
against Hindu groups involved in the riots as well.87 Instead, the State
chose to use POTA to protect majoritarian interests.88
All but one of Gujarat’s POTA detainees was Muslim and law en-
forcement ofªcers appeared to be evading the few existing safeguards
intended to protect these detainees from abuse.89 According to Am-
nesty International, police held people for questioning for days or
weeks without access to family members or to counsel, frustrated ha-
beas corpus applications, and threatened to arrest family members un-
der POTA if they petitioned the government.90 Some detainees com-
plained of being tortured into giving confessions, in spite of POTA
provisions limiting the admissibility of self-incriminating statements.91 It
                                                                                                                     
83 See Desai, supra note 82, ¶¶ 1, 2.
84 Modi Denies Planning Snap Poll in Gujarat, Hindu (India), Mar. 31, 2002, ¶ 7, available
at http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/03/31/stories/2002033102520800.htm.
85 See The Current Crisis in South Asia, supra note 4, at 14 (statement by Anatol Lieven,
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace); “We Have No Orders to
Save You,” supra note 37, at 4. On the day of the train attack, a major Hindu nationalist
party ordered a state wide shut down for the following day, which its cadre interpreted as a
call to action. “We Have No Orders to Save You,” supra note 37, at 21. Numerous eyewitnesses
reported nearly identical attacks during the riot throughout the state capital. Id. at 22.
Trucks delivered thousands of attackers wearing clothing identiªed with the Hindu na-
tionalist movement and armed with swords, spears, explosives, and gas canisters. Id. The
attackers were equipped with printouts of the addresses of Muslim families and their prop-
erties as well as voting lists, cell phones, and water bottles. Id. at 23.
86 See Abuse of Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 3–4.
87 See id. at 14; Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15 (India), § 3(1), (3), reprinted
in Thakur, supra note 6, at 10–12.
88 See Abuse of Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 14–15.
89 See id. at 1; Harsh Mander, State Subversion, Gujarat’s Victims Completely Isolated, Times
of India, Nov. 22, 2003, ¶ 5, available at http://timesoªndia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/
295528.cms.
90 See Abuse of Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–2, 5, 6.
91 Id. at 11–12.
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appears that in Gujarat, some police compounded government preju-
dice with personal prejudice and improper police work.92
Unfortunately, however, Gujarat was not the only state that tar-
geted Muslim minorities arbitrarily.93 In April 2003, police in Uttar
Pradesh arrested two Kashmiri Muslim students for allegedly sympathiz-
ing with a Muslim terrorist group.94 Every Kashmiri in an area of the
state frequented by students became a suspect in a sweeping investiga-
tion.95 Investigators searched school records and school managers kept
Kashmiri students under observation.96
Similar to POTA’s arbitrary application along communal and mi-
nority lines was its arbitrary use against political opponents in at least
three states.97 For example, in Uttar Pradesh, after months of harass-
ment in the form of twenty criminal charges and various raids on
their property, Chief Minister Mayawati arrested her longtime politi-
cal rival and his seventy-three-year-old father under POTA.98 The me-
dia and allies of the accused criticized the arrest noisily, but the cen-
tral government, needing Mayawati’s support in upcoming elections,
tacitly approved.99 After defeating Mayawati at the polls, but before
being sworn in, her successor, Mulayam Singh Yadav, immediately re-
                                                                                                                     
92 See id. at 6, 14–15; Desai, supra note 82, ¶ 7. Amnesty International received numer-
ous reports of illegal detentions, torture, and irregular police work in Gujarat. See Abuse
of the Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–2, 6, 11. Within a month of the murder of a
former Gujarat Home Minister, police had arrested approximately 380 Muslims. Id. at 3, 6.
Large-scale arrests allegedly connected to the incident continued as of September 2003. Id.
at 6. Police detained many suspects informally for days or weeks of interrogation without
access to counsel and kept no records. Id. Police allowed some detainees to see their fami-
lies but forbade others. Id. Prosecutors and court ofªcials in at least one case seriously
mishandled a habeas corpus proceeding, while police allegedly terrorized relatives of the
suspects into silence. See id. at 4–6. Gujarat police may have acted out of incompetence or
animus toward Muslims. See id. at 6, 14–15; Desai, supra note 82, ¶ 7. Statements attributed
to Gujarat’s Joint Commissioner of Police suggest that police misinterpreted India’s Code
of Criminal Procedure regarding arrest and detention. See Abuse of the Law in Gujarat,
supra note 16, at 7–8. On the other hand, there are indications that police intentionally
applied POTA arbitrarily and punitively against Muslims. See id. at 14–15.
93 See Kavita Chowdhury, POTA’s New Victims: Kashmiri Students, Ostracised, Watched, In-
dian Express, Mar. 15, 2003, ¶ 1, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/
full_story.php?content_id=20223; Amit Sharma, In UP, You Need to Be a Kashmiri to Know,
Indian Express, Apr. 2, 2003, ¶ 1, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.
php?content_id=21269.
94 Chowdhury, supra note 93, ¶ 3; Sharma, supra note 93, ¶ 1.
95 See Chowdhury, supra note 93, ¶ 5; Sharma, supra note 93, ¶ 5.
96 See Chowdhury, supra note 93, ¶¶ 5, 6.
97 See Selective Use of POTA, supra note 17, ¶¶ 1–3; Tripathi, supra note 17, ¶¶ 3–5.
98 See Uprety, supra note 17, ¶¶ 10–13. Police claim to have recovered a huge cache of
arms and a skeleton from the accused’s premises. Id. ¶ 11.
99 See Tripathi, supra note 17, ¶¶ 3, 4.
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leased Mayawati’s rivals.100 The POTA court, however, summarily re-
scinded his order as arbitrary.101
In March 2002, police in Jammu and Kashmir invoked POTA to
detain a political ªgure sympathetic to the separatist movement.102 A
frequent detainee under POTA’s forerunners, Yasin Malik is a promi-
nent ªgure in a coalition of parties which have long sought independ-
ence, or at least autonomy, from the Indian union.103 This time, police
alleged that Malik illegally received a large sum of money from Paki-
stani couriers.104 In July 2002, a merciful POTA court granted Malik bail
because of his frail health.105 Undeterred, police rearrested Malik
within minutes under Jammu and Kashmir’s Public Safety Act, which
permits preventative detentions.106 The police detained Malik for ªve
months before the state’s new coalition government ordered his re-
lease.107 The government proclaimed magnanimously that the release
reºected “a policy shift. We would re-arrest the militants whom we
wanted to conªne [in the past] but the new government wants to let
them off. That speaks about a new policy.”108 More accurately, Malik’s
detention and release speaks about the arbitrary application of POTA
and related laws in Jammu and Kashmir.109
The most signiªcant example of political abuse, however, oc-
curred in July of 2002, in the State of Tamil Nadu.110 Chief Minister J.
Jayalalitha arrested several members of a rival party for publicly ex-
pressing sympathy for the banned LTTE.111 Prominent among those
                                                                                                                     
100 Malhotra, supra note 76, ¶ 8.
101 Id.
102 See Shujaat Bukhari, Yasin Malik Released, Hindu (India), Nov. 12, 2002, ¶ 1, avail-
able at http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/11/12/stories/2002111205080100.
htm.
103 See Arun Sharma, Releases in J&K: Court Records Rebut BJP Claim, Indian Express, Nov.
27, 2002, ¶¶ 6–7, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=13753
(discussing Malik’s prior arrests and detentions); Malik Back to Basics: Mission Azad Kashmir,
Indian Express, Nov. 16, 2002, ¶ 1, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?
content_id=13139 (discussing Malik’s mission to liberate Kashmir).
104 Bukhari, supra note 102, ¶ 7; Ahmad, supra note 37, ¶ 6.
105 Ahmad, supra note 37, ¶¶ 3–4.
106 Id. ¶ 1.
107 See id.; Bukhari, supra note 104, ¶¶ 1–9.
108 Mufti Islah, Mufti’s Healing Touch: Yasin Malik Returns Home from Jail, Indian Express,
Nov. 12, 2002, ¶ 6, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=
12927.
109 See Ahmad, supra note 37, ¶ 1; Bukhari, supra note 102, ¶¶ 1, 7–10; Islah, supra note
108, ¶¶ 4–7.
110 See N. Sathiya Moorthy, TN Police Arrests MDMK Leader Vaiko, Rediff.com (India),
¶¶ 1, 2 ( July 11, 2002), at http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/jul/11vaiko7.htm.
111 See id. ¶¶ 1, 16–18.
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detained was Vaiko, the general secretary of a Tamil nationalist politi-
cal party known as the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
(MDMK).112 With his detention, Vaiko became the ªrst member of
Parliament and chief of a registered political party in the country de-
tained under POTA.113 After over four and a half months of incarcera-
tion without charge, police ªnally charged Vaiko, along with eight
other MDMK ofªcials, in a 440-page report alleging violations of sec-
tions 21(2) and (3) of POTA.114 Vaiko’s challenges to the charges and
detention at last prompted the Supreme Court to clarify that a mere
expression of sympathy or verbal support would not satisfy section
21.115 Undaunted, Tamil Nadu pressed forward with its case.116
Largely in response to Vaiko’s detention and prosecution, the
central government gave POTA’s central review commission the
power to issue binding opinions on the validity of a state’s prima facie
case.117 Jayalalitha challenged the review committee’s jurisdiction over
Vaiko’s case, which was proceeding in court.118 Despite the review
committee’s rejection of the challenge, the POTA judge appealed to
the Madras High Court.119 Finally, on February 7, 2004, as Vaiko
awaited word from the POTA court, the review committee, or the
High Court, the POTA court released him on bail after eighteen
months of needless detention.120
IV. Curbing the Abuse
Overzealous law enforcement ofªcers and executive ofªcials
could easily abuse anti-terror laws like the USA PATRIOT Act and
POTA along communal and political lines.121 Broad statutory
                                                                                                                     
112 Id. ¶ 1.
113 Id.
114 See Charge Sheet Filed Against MDMK’s Vaiko, Rediff.com (India), ¶¶ 1, 2, 3, 5 (Dec.
30, 2002), at http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/dec/30vaiko.htm.
115 See id. ¶¶ 8–10; Supreme Court Upholds POTA, supra note 43, ¶¶ 1–6.
116 See Subramani, supra, note 67, ¶¶ 1–2.
117 See Dhavan, supra note 69, ¶¶ 3, 4, 6; Iype, supra note 16, ¶¶ 5, 6, 10, 13; Reform
Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶¶ 5–8.
118 POTA Panel’s Verdict on January 23, Hindu (India), Jan. 21, 2004, ¶ 1, available at
http://www.hindu.com/2004/01/21/stories/2004012104501100.htm.
119 POTA Panel Order Challenged, Hindu (India), Jan. 21, 2004, ¶ 1, available at http://
www.hindu.com/2004/01/28/stories/2004012812650400.htm.
120 See Vaiko Released from Prison, Rediff.com (India), ¶ 1 (Feb. 7, 2004), at http://www.
rediff.com/election/2004/feb/07mdmk.htm.
121 In the months immediately following September 11, the U.S. government inter-
viewed or interrogated thousands of Arab and Muslim Americans for no apparent reason
other than nationality or religion. See Christopher Edley, Jr., The New American Dilemma:
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deªnitions and sweeping investigative powers alone make this possible
in the climate of fear that persists even years after the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001.122 Because POTA also curtailed procedural
safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention, and because India is
home to numerous minority groups and separatist movements, abuses
of the anti-terror law in India were widespread, often painfully visible,
and likely to persist.123
                                                                                                                     
Racial Proªling Post-9/11, in The War on Our Freedoms: Civil Liberties in an Age of
Terrorism 173 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003). The U.S. government
continues to investigate Muslim charities based on undisclosed or minimal evidence of
terrorist links. See id. at 174. Moreover, the Department of Justice directed the ªfty-six ªeld
ofªces of the FBI to do an inventory of local mosques to prepare for counter-terrorism
investigations. See id. A top FBI ofªcial involved in the mosque inventory said, “This is not
politically correct, no question about it. . . . But it would be stupid not to look at this given
the number of criminal mosques that may be out there.” Michael Isikoff, The FBI Says,
Count the Mosques, Newsweek, Feb. 3, 2003, at 6. The U.S. government also has a history of
using special investigative powers against political ªgures and organizations. See Ann Bee-
son, On the Home Front: A Lawyer’s Struggle to Defend Rights After 9/11, in The War on Our
Freedoms, supra, at 298–299. The FBI wiretapped the homes of Martin Luther King Jr. and
other dissidents solely because of their political beliefs. Id. at 298. The CIA spied on thou-
sands of Americans including anti-war protestors, student activists, and black nationalists.
Id. Furthermore, the 1976 Church Committee’s Report disclosed that the FBI had com-
piled over 500,000 intelligence ªles on individual Americans and domestic organizations,
including 65,000 new ªles in 1972 alone. Id. at 298–99; see also Nicholas C. Dranias, The
Patriot Act of 2001 Versus the 1976 Church Committee Report: An Unavoidable Clash of Fundamen-
tal Policy Judgments, 17 Chi. B. Ass’n Rec. 28, 28–30 (2003).
122 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2003) (deªning domestic terrorism under USA PATRIOT
Act); Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15 (India), § 3, reprinted in Thakur, supra note
6, at 10–12 (deªning terrorist offenses); South Asia Human Rights Documentation Cen-
tre, supra note 8, at 43 (discussing the broad deªnition of terrorism in POTO, which is iden-
tical to the deªnition in POTA); Richard C. Leone, The Quiet Republic: The Missing Debate
About Civil Liberties After 9/11, in The War on Our Freedoms, supra note 121, at 67 (2003)
(discussing climate of fear and sweeping investigative powers); Lobel, supra note 40, at 789
(discussing the broad deªnition of terrorism and sweeping investigative powers in the USA
PATRIOT Act); Dalia Sussman, Rights Intrusions All Right, ABCNEWS.com, ¶ 1 (Sept. 10,
2003), at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/World/sept11_terrorwar_poll030910.
html (discussing U.S. poll indicating Americans were still willing to sacriªce personal liberty
to protect against terrorism even two years after the September 11 attacks). As discussed, the
abuses of POTA across India are themselves indicative of the climate of fear that persists in
the country.
123 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 49(2), (6)–(7), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6,
at 43–45 (permitting up to 180 days detention without charge and denial of bail without
evidence of innocence); World Factbook supra note 26, at 249 (presenting data on sev-
eral Indian religious and ethnic minorities); Law Commission of India, §§ II 1.3–.10,
reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 56–61 (discussing separatism and terrorist violence in
India associated with ethnic and religious minorities); Abuse of the Law in Gujarat,
supra note 16, at 1–2 (discussing arbitrary and abusive detention of Muslim minorities in
Gujarat); South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 87, 89
(discussing POTO’s effect on length of detention and bail proceedings and the constitu-
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Concerns about abuse prompted some of POTA’s critics to dis-
miss the law altogether.124 In addition to the prevalent abuse of the
law, critics argued that it was redundant or ineffective.125 Supporters
of POTA, however, contended that at least some of its provisions for
enhanced surveillance were necessary to combat the threat.126 Terror-
ists tend to operate in extraordinary secrecy and witnesses may be too
frightened to report to police or testify in court.127 Moreover, India’s
overburdened legal system could lead to special terrorist courts less-
ening jail time for accused terrorists and ordinary criminals alike.128
                                                                                                                     
tional guarantee of a speedy trial); Sinha & Chowdhury, supra note 73, ¶ 8 graphic (report-
ing widespread and inconsistent use of POTA across India).
124 South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 10 (oppos-
ing POTO); Dhavan, supra note 69, ¶ 11 (arguing that the legislature should repeal
POTA); Throw POTA Out, Hindu (India), Oct. 28, 2003, ¶ 6, available at
http://www.hindu.com/2003/10/28/stories/2003102800961000.htm (arguing that the
government should repeal POTA).
125 See Anti-Terrorism Laws: India, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Israel 3–4 (K.R. Gupta ed., 2002) (discussing criticism that POTA is redundant and would
likely lead to few convictions) [hereinafter Anti-Terrorism Laws]; South Asia Human
Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 17–19, 23–25 (arguing that POTO is
redundant and likely to be ineffective). Critics pointed out that India already had two
dozen special security laws that should have been adequate to combat terrorism. Anti-
Terrorism Laws, supra, at 3; South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra
note 8, at 17–19. Furthermore, all the acts of violence mentioned in POTA were already
illegal under the Indian Penal Code. Anti-Terrorism Laws, supra, at 3; South Asia Hu-
man Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 20–23. Criticism that POTA would
nab few terrorists stemmed from the precedent set by TADA, POTA’s predecessor, which
lapsed in 1995. See South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at
31, 32. The conviction rate under TADA was less than one percent and ofªcials misapplied
the law in more than 50,000 cases. Id. at 31.
126 See Law Commission of India, § IV, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 79 (ex-
plaining that terrorists seek to instill silence among witnesses through fear); Anti-
Terrorism Laws, supra note 125, at 9 (arguing that Indian police obtained vital links in at
least one case through mobile phone intercepts that would have been unavailable prior to
POTO); Steven A. Osher, Privacy, Computers and the PATRIOT Act: The Fourth Amendment
Isn’t Dead, But No One Will Insure It, 54 Fla. L. Rev. 521, 521 (2002) (asserting that after
September 11, “urgent measures were needed to restore domestic security” in the United
States); Michael F. Dowley, Note, Government Surveillance Powers Under the USA PATRIOT Act:
Is It Possible to Protect National Security and Privacy at the Same Time? A Constitutional Tug-of-
War, 36 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 165, 179 (2002) (arguing that the USA PATRIOT Act “may
ensure America’s continued existence by allowing government agents to keep pace with
technological advancements and monitor elusive terror networks within this country’s
borders”).
127 Law Commission of India, § IV, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 79 (explain-
ing that “one of the prime objects of creating terror is to silence the people by instilling a
psychosis of fear in them”); Dowley, supra note 126, at 179 (arguing that the USA PA-
TRIOT Act will help to monitor secretive terrorist networks).
128 See Law Commission of India, § VI(b), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 116–
17. The Law Commission of India explicitly observes that:
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Because POTA gave police broad, if not indiscriminate, powers of
arrest and detention for a variety of ill-deªned and constitutionally
untested offenses, Indian citizens had far more to fear than infringe-
ments upon their privacy.129 The extent of POTA’s abuse proved that
fear of prolonged, arbitrary detention was not unfounded or conjec-
tural.130 The Indian government can, however, salvage the most essen-
tial pieces of POTA and eliminate those that deny liberty to Indians
and legitimacy to the law.
A. Redeªning Terror
An amendment to POTA that would go far in preventing arbi-
trary arrests and detentions would be one that narrows the deªnition
of terrorism and its related offenses.131 Unfortunately, this is a difªcult
task.132 The phrase, “One man’s freedom ªghter is another man’s ter-
rorist” is more than a cliché; it is a complex reality.133 One scholar ob-
serves that the phrase “captures the ambiguity, politicization, moral
judgment, and high stakes involved in deªning terrorism.”134
A simple deªnition might be “the deliberate creation and exploita-
tion of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of
                                                                                                                     
So far as special courts are concerned, their creation has become necessary
because of the extraordinary heavy load upon our criminal courts and the de-
lays endemic to our criminal judicial system. . . . The principle and perhaps
sole object behind [sic] creation of special courts is the anxiety to have these
cases disposed of expeditiously.
Id.
129 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15 (India), §§ 3, 49(2), (6)–(7), reprinted
in Thakur, supra note 6, at 10–12, 43–45 (deªning terrorist offenses, permitting up to 180
days detention without charge, and denying bail without evidence of innocence); South
Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 87, 89 (discussingPOTO’s
effect on length of detention and bail proceedings).
130 See Abuse of the Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–2 (discussing illegal deten-
tion and torture in Gujarat); Prasad, supra note 18, ¶¶ 1–10 (reporting that Jharkhand
police arrested a fourteen-year-old boy, a ªfteen-year-old boy, and ªve women); Charge Sheet
Filed Against MDMK’s Vaiko, supra note 114, ¶¶ 1, 4 (reporting formal charges against a
Tamil Nadu political opposition leader ªled over ªve months after his detention).
131 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 3, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 21; South
Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 4; Lakshmi Iyer, Blunting
the Edge, India Today, Nov. 10, 2003, at 30, available at 2003 WL 2170360.
132 Freeman, supra note 39, at 25; see also Law Commission of India, § IV, reprinted in
Thakur, supra note 6, at 74–82 (discussing the legislative intent behind various deªnitions
of terrorism-related offenses included in POTA).
133 See Freeman, supra note 39, at 25.
134 Id.
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political change.”135 Although concise, this deªnition easily enables po-
litical bias to affect enforcement and adjudication.136 In contrast, listing
speciªc acts would help to curb such abuses of discretion.137 In this re-
gard, India had done more to delineate terrorist offenses than the
United States or the United Kingdom.138 POTA speciªed the prohibi-
tion of violent or destructive acts that involve weapons, explosives,
inºammable substances, gases, chemicals and other lethal weapons.139
At the same time, however, POTA undermined any beneªts of speciªcity
by following its list with the words “or by any other means whatsoever,”
which rendered the deªnition overbroad and again invited abuse.140
On the other hand, POTA deªned the perpetrator’s intent far
more explicitly than several other countries.141 Under POTA, a terror-
                                                                                                                     
135 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism 43 (1998).
136 See Susan Tiefenbrun, A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Deªnition of Terrorism, 9 ILSA J.
Int’l Comp. L. 357, 365 (2003) (arguing that States may abuse or misapply broad
deªnitions of terrorism); Law Commission of India, § IV, reprinted in Thakur, supra note
6, at 74–82 (discussing the legislative intent behind various deªnitions of terrorism-related
offenses included in POTA).
137 See Tiefenbrun, supra note 136, at 365. A disadvantage of listing speciªc acts is that
the deªnition may not apply to new modalities of terror made possible by advances in
technology. Id. India might be particularly attuned to such dangers as it is home to nu-
merous information technology jobs and Internet access is widespread. John Lancaster,
Village Kiosks Bridge India’s Digital Divide, Wash. Post, Oct. 12, 2003, at A1 (discussing
Internet access in remote villages); Robert J. Samuelson, The Specter of Outsourcing, Wash.
Post, Jan. 14, 2004, at A19 (discussing the movement of software and communication jobs
to India). However, the drafters of POTA were apparently unconcerned about cyber-
terrorism because the deªnition of terrorist acts includes only violent acts or acts relating
to terrorist organizations. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, § 3, reprinted in Thakur,
supra note 6, at 10–12 (deªning terrorism without speciªc provision for cyber-terrorism);
Law Commission of India, § IV, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 74–82 (discussing the
legislative intent behind various deªnitions of terrorism-related offenses included in
POTA, but not mentioning cyber-terrorism).
138 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2003) (broadly deªning domestic terrorism under the USA
PATRIOT Act without delineating speciªc acts); Tiefenbrun, supra note 136, at 369 (discuss-
ing the United Kingdom’s deªnition of terrorism that is broad but speciªcally includes “acts
that create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public . . . or disrupt an electronic sys-
tem”); Jason Binimow & Amy Bunk, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of “Foreign
Terrorist Organization” Provision of Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1189, 178 A.L.R. Fed. 535, 545–46, 550 (2002) (discussing the United States’ vague
deªnition of terror under 1996 anti-terror legislation). But see Tiefenbrun, supra note 136, at
371, 373–74 (discussing Canadian and French anti-terror laws which delineate speciªc acts of
terrorism including hijacking, murder, and other acts of violence).
139 Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 3(1), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 10.
140 Id.; Tiefenbrun, supra note 136, at 365.
141 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(B) (2003) (requiring that an act “appear to be intended” to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population or government); Prevention of Terrorism Act,
§ 3(1)(a), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 10, 18; Tiefenbrun, supra note 136, at 369
(discussing the United Kingdom’s deªnition of terrorism, which requires that an act be
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ist act required “intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sov-
ereignty of India or to strike terror in the people . . . .”142 However,
POTA applied to other crimes involving unlicensed weapons so long
as the individual “voluntarily does an act aiding or promoting in any
manner the objects of” a terrorist group.143 Despite the prerequisite of
voluntariness, the text did not require the intent to aid or promote
terrorist objectives.144 It is entirely possible that many violent or de-
structive crimes will coincide with terrorist objectives, particularly
when those crimes generate public unrest.145
Moreover, one criminal offense provision made no mention of in-
tent.146 Section 21 barred an individual from “invit[ing]support for a ter-
rorist organization” or “address[ing] a meeting for the purpose of en-
couraging support for a terrorist organization . . . .”147 Upon Tamil Nadu’s
arrest of MDMK minister Vaiko under this section for allegedly stating in
public his support of the banned LTTE, the Supreme Court clariªed that
the provision did not encompass such actions.148 Speciªcally, the Court
declared that the mere expression of sympathy or verbal support did not
satisfy section 21 in the absence of an “intent [to] further[] or en-
courag[e] terrorist activity or facilitat[e]its commission.”149 Hopefully, the
legislature will draft subsequent anti-terror legislation accordingly.150
                                                                                                                     
“designed to inºuence the government or intimidate the public,” or “made for the pur-
pose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause”). The French, on the other
hand, explicitly include an element of intent. See Tiefenbrun, supra note 136, at 371 (trans-
lating French anti-terror laws to require an act be “intentionally committed . . . in order to
seriously disturb law and order by intimidation or by terror”).
142 Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 3(1)(a), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 10.
143 See id., § 3(1)(b), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 11.
144 See id.
145 See Tiefenbrun, supra note 136, at 380. For example, a violent robbery that injures a
group of people can incidentally cause widespread fear and weaken the local government.
See id. Terrorist groups can beneªt from such lawlessness and political insecurity, particu-
larly if they seek to overthrow the local government. See id.
146 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 21(1), (3), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at
21–22.
147 See id.
148 Supreme Court Upholds POTA, supra note 43, ¶¶ 1, 4.
149 Id. ¶ 9.
150 See id. The Supreme Court’s ruling should have been unnecessary given the Law
Commission’s guidance regarding the Prevention of Terrorism Bill in 2000, which precipi-
tated POTA. See Law Commission of India, § IV, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 82.
The Law Commission cautioned that “inclusion of mere offensive speech in this Bill is
liable to be termed a case of over-reaction and a disproportionate response . . . . [S]uch
speech or its punishment should not ªnd place in an anti-terrorism law.” Id. at 82. No
member of the parliament raised this issue during the debate over POTA in 2002, and the
Tamil Nadu government preferred its own interpretation of the ambiguous statute. See
Moorthy, supra note 110, ¶ 2 (reporting that Tamil Nadu police arrested Vaiko under
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Delineating terrorist acts with greater speciªcity and explicitly
requiring intent as an element of all terrorist offenses could limit dis-
cretion and stave off abuse.151 A comprehensive, yet less malleable,
deªnition of terrorism than that provided in POTA is beyond the
scope of this Note.152 Presumably, however, it is not beyond the scope
of India’s legislature or those of other nations ªghting terrorism.153
B. Detention Without Charge
Given TADA’s unpopularity, the Indian legislature wisely declined
to allow preventative detentions under POTA.154 However, states could
use POTA to the same effect, namely by locking individuals away
without charge for twice the time period permitted under ordinary
criminal laws.155 Without sufªcient accountability before the court, it
is difªcult to determine whether an arrest is preemptive rather than a
response to a previous terrorist act.156
                                                                                                                     
POTA for making speeches in support of the Tamil Tigers); Under POTA, Life & Liberty on
Trial, Hindu (India), ¶ 9 (May 13, 2003), at http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/op/2003/
05/13/stories/2003051300020200.htm (observing that the Indian parliament did not discuss
the Law Commission’s position of free speech under POTA.).
151 See Tiefenbrun, supra note 136, at 365, 380; Iyer, supra note 131, ¶ 10.
152 See Hoffman, supra note 135, at 154 (discussing a deªnition of terrorism); Tiefen-
brun, supra note 136, at 378–79 (arguing that more multilateral conventions could reach a
universally-accepted deªnition of terrorism).
153 See Tiefenbrun, supra note 136, at 388–89. Through semiotic analysis, Professor Su-
san Tiefenbrun argues that deªnitions of terrorism generally include ªve basic structural
elements. Id. at 388. These include: (1) the perpetration of violence by any means; (2) the
targeting of innocent civilians; (3) intent to cause violence or wanton disregard for conse-
quences; (4) the purpose of causing fear, coercion, or intimidation, and (5) political, mili-
tary, ethnic, ideological, or religious ends. Id. at 360–61. An awareness of these com-
monalities and persistent domestic and multilateral efforts could lead to less malleable
deªnitions with universal acceptability and more uniform application. See id. at 388–89.
154 See POTA Prospects, supra note 21, ¶¶ 8, 19. In a debate over POTA in India’s Parlia-
ment, Home Minister L.K. Advani asserted, “[I]n the new Bill, all the shortcomings that we
experienced in the case of TADA—perhaps the Executive at that time in the States or at
the Centre sometimes was tempted to abuse it—have been sought to be eliminated.” Id.
¶ 9. In response to Advani’s defenses, a rival parliamentarian argued, “[W]e have learnt
from the TADA . . . but you have unlearnt from it.” Id. ¶ 8.
155 See South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 4 (argu-
ing that POTA’s detention provisions are illegitimate and “subvert the cardinal rule of the
criminal justice system by placing the burden on the accused”); “We Have No Orders to Save
You,” supra note 37, at 14 (equating abuses under POTA with those under TADA, which
permitted preventative detentions); Ahmad, supra note 37, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4 (reporting that after
being granted bail under POTA, police alternatively arrested Kashmiri political activist
Yasin Malik under a preventative detention law for “anti-national activities,” thus suggest-
ing that the laws might be used interchangeably).
156 See “We Have No Orders to Save You,” supra note 37, at 14 (equating abuses under
POTA with those under TADA, which permitted preventative detentions).
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Even in India, where lengthier detentions have prevailed in the
past, a six-month incarceration without charge is simply too long.157
Such lengthy detentions arguably violate India’s constitutional guar-
antee to a speedy trial and invite custodial abuses that go undetected
by the courts.158 The danger of terrorism only partially justiªed
POTA’s harsh law enforcement procedures.159 Because no compelling
reason for doubling the pre-charge detention period existed or had
even been offered, the provision was arbitrary.160
The Law Commission Report on India’s 2000 Prevention of Ter-
rorism Bill, which precipitated POTA, acknowledged without comment
that the proposed law sought to lengthen the duration of detention
permitted under India’s Code of Criminal Procedure.161 The report did
mention, however, that the legislature sought to grant the special court
discretion to lengthen that period “in case it is not possible to conclude
investigation within such extended period.”162 One leading criminal
lawyer observed that under POTA, “[t]he investigating agency [was]
not under any duress to complete investigations in [ninety] days” as
under ordinary criminal law.163 What remains unclear, however, is why
time limits placed on investigation of terrorist-related offenses are any
more onerous than those placed on ordinary crimes.164
                                                                                                                     
157 See South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 4, 10.
158 See India Const., pt. III, art. 21 (stating that “no person shall be deprived of his life
or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”); Abuse of Law in
Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–2, 13–14 (describing alleged custodial abuses in Gujarat);
Vijayashri Sripati, Toward Fifty Years of Constitutionalism and Fundamental Rights in India: Look-
ing Back to See Ahead, 1950–2000, 14 Am. U. Int’l. L. Rev. 413, 443–44 (1998) (observing
that the Indian Supreme Court interprets Article 21 of the Indian Constitution as requir-
ing a speedy trial).
159 See South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 12 (ar-
guing that national security laws in India are usually defended on the grounds of extreme
threats to public order, but are consistently applied in an arbitrary and prejudicial man-
ner). The Law Commission on the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2000, acknowledged the
severity of the terrorist threat but proceeded to discuss speciªc justiªcations for new evi-
dentiary procedures. See Law Commission of India, § III, reprinted in Thakur, supra note
6, at 70–71. The Commission offered no speciªc justiªcations for longer detention peri-
ods. See id. § V, at 102–03.
160 See South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 4, 10
(asserting that legislators defend national security laws by citing serious threats to the pub-
lic, but law enforcement ofªcers usually apply such laws in an arbitrary and prejudicial
manner); Law Commission of India, § III, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, 102–03
(brieºy mentioning longer detention periods for terror suspects without offering speciªc
justiªcation).
161 Law Commission of India, § V, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 103.
162 Id.
163 Anti-Terrorism Laws, supra note 125, at 10.
164 See id.; Law Commission of India, § V, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 103.
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Indeed, POTA’s provisions authorized police to compel evidence,
conduct electronic surveillance, and record confessions; allowances
that should actually expedite investigations and obviate the need for
lengthy detention without charge.165 Perversely, however, police in Gu-
jarat appear to have used the extended detention periods to unlawfully
coerce people into confessing instead of conducting fair and diligent
police work.166
One common justiªcation for prolonged detention without charge
is intelligence gathering.167 Law enforcement ofªcers have a legitimate
interest in questioning terror suspects in order to uncover clandestine
networks, and prolonged detention could extract confessions or infor-
mation that suspects might otherwise conceal.168 Nevertheless, the In-
dian Constitution protects its citizens from self-incrimination and guar-
antees a speedy trial.169 Even during a declared emergency, wherein the
executive is permitted to derogate from fundamental rights, it is un-
likely that 180-day interrogations are constitutional.170
                                                                                                                     
165 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15 (India), §§ 27, 32, 36–48, reprinted in
Thakur, supra note 6, at 26, 30–31, 32–43.
166 See Abuse of Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–2, 6, 11.
167 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 49–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The U.S. gov-
ernment offered intelligence gathering as a justiªcation for detaining a U.S. citizen sus-
pected of terrorism indeªnitely, without access to family or counsel. See id.
168 See Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 49 (citing the U.S. government’s argument that a de-
tained terror suspect could potentially provide information about terrorist training, plan-
ning, and recruitment methods); Law Commission of India, § III, reprinted in Thakur,
supra note 6, at 71 (discussing the difªculties of investigating terrorism through conven-
tional methods). Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence
Agency, argued that “[d]eveloping the kind of relationship of trust and dependency neces-
sary for effective interrogations” could take months or even years. See Padilla, 243 F.
Supp. 2d at 49.
169 India Const., pt. III, arts. 20, 21 (stating that “no person accused of any offense
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself” and “no person shall be deprived of his
life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”); Sripati, supra
note 143, at 431, 443–44 (observing that Article 21 of the Indian Constitution mandates a
speedy trial).
170 See India Const., pt. III, arts. 20, 21 (stating that “no person accused of any offense
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself” and “no person shall be deprived of his
life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”); Sripati, supra
note 158, at 431, 443–44 (observing that the Indian Constitution grants freedom from self-
incrimination and mandates a speedy trial). The Indian Constitution permits the suspen-
sion of otherwise non-derogable fundamental rights during an emergency. India Const.,
pt. XVIII, arts. 352–60. Indira Gandhi declared an Emergency and suspended the Indian
Constitution from June 1975 through March 1977. Sripati, supra note 158, at 420. The
Emergency was unpopular and helped sweep Gandhi’s party out of power. See id. at 465.
The new government amended the Constitution to prohibit the suspension of Articles 20
and 21, even during an Emergency. See India Const., pt. XVIII, art. 359; Sripati, supra note
158, at 465.
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Another possible justiªcation for increasing the power of the po-
lice to detain without charge is that such powers help police contain
and eliminate a particular terrorist group entirely.171 A wide net cast
with broad discretion could entrap a terrorist network more quickly
than it could replenish its ranks, and thus neutralize its threat alto-
gether.172 According to this scheme, innocent detainees would be
sifted out over time, and the infringement on their liberties is justiªed
by the eradication of a serious public danger.173
Countries around the world have invoked the overreach-and-
eliminate strategy to justify a host of emergency measures against ter-
rorists, including that of preventative detention.174 History has demon-
strated the perils of such a strategy.175 Police are almost certain to de-
tain large numbers of innocent people and success likely would vary
greatly across India.176 Although the strategy might be feasible in Pun-
jab, where militant groups are small and geographically contained, 177
in Jammu and Kashmir, the regular inºux of militants from Pakistan
                                                                                                                     
171 See Freeman, supra note 39, at 11–12.
172 See id. However, should police arrest large numbers of citizens they know are inno-
cent in the hope of improving their chances of capturing a true terrorist, this would be
clearly abusive and unjustiªed. See id. at 38–39.
173 See id. at 2, 11. Canada successfully applied this strategy against the Front de Libera-
tion du Quebec (FLQ) in 1970. Id. at 117. Police conducted searches and arrests without
warrants and held suspects for up to twenty-one days in jail without charges. Id. at 117.
Kidnappings and bombings stopped and the FLQ ceased to exist within months. Id.
174 See id. at 7. These countries include Britain, Italy, Uruguay, Canada, and Israel. Id.
Detention without trial was the principle method used to combat terrorism in Northern
Ireland in order to isolate all terrorists from the population. Id. at 58.
175 See Freeman, supra note 39, at 8. In Northern Ireland, the strategy was ineffective
because security forces were unable to detain terrorists faster than they could be replaced.
Id. at 61. Uruguay invoked the strategy with some success, but the police and military
abused their powers. Id. at 108. In Peru, the government was unable to detain terrorists
faster than they could be replaced, and the government abused its powers. Id. at 159, 165.
176 See id. at 2, 11–12 (discussing the inevitable costs of emergency powers and their
varying effectiveness against terrorist threats); Law Commission of India, § II 1.3–1.9,
reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 56–60 (discussing different terrorist threats in Tamil
Nadu, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and the northeast region); Sinha & Chowdhury, supra
note 73, ¶ 8 graphic (showing disparities in the application of POTA throughout India).
177 See Law Commission of India, § II 1.4, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 57–58
(estimating about 300 active militants present in Punjab as of 2000); Freeman, supra note
39, at 189 (arguing that emergency powers are likely to be effective where “the state can
move quickly against a small and weakly supported terrorist group . . . .”); The Current Crisis
in South Asia, supra note 4, at 10 (statement of Michael Krepon, Founding President, The
Henry L. Stimson Center) (discussing Pakistani support for militancy in Kashmir).
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makes laws like POTA largely ineffective. Worse, such laws could fur-
ther alienate Kashmiris and bolster sympathy for terrorist causes.178
In light of the abuses of POTA and its predecessors, Indian legisla-
tors should conform future Indian anti-terror laws more closely to the
standard procedures of the Indian Penal Code.179 Speciªcally, reducing
the permissible detention period would encourage police to conduct
more careful investigations prior to arresting people under POTA’s
successors.180 Though a shorter detention period might not necessarily
eliminate arbitrary detention, it would at least limit the duration of the
injustice.181
C. The Review Process
Given POTA’s markedly subjective deªnitions of terrorism, mean-
ingful review was essential.182 Threat perceptions vary greatly from
state to state within India; thus, an effective central review committee
                                                                                                                     
178 The Current Crisis in South Asia, supra note 4, at 13 (statement of Anatol Lieven, Sen-
ior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) (arguing that “ruthless re-
pression by the Indian armed forces . . . fueled the growth of Kashmiri extremism and
militancy and led to a cycle of violence both by Indian security forces and by the
Kashmirian [sic] militants”); Freeman, supra note 39, at 189 (asserting that harsh U.K.
detention laws bolstered support for the Irish Republican Army). But see generally Singh,
supra note 5 (arguing for a tougher approach to terrorism in Kashmir).
179 See South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 10.
180 See id. at 31 (discussing the broad powers of arrests and detentions under TADA,
which led to thousands of improper arrests and a conviction rate below one percent). One
supporter of POTA argued that low conviction rates under TADA were comparable to the
overall criminal conviction rate in India of six and one half percent. See Anti-Terrorism
Laws, supra note 125, at 4. K.P.S. Gill, former Director General of Police in Punjab
quipped, “[I]f the inefªciency and incompetence of India’s criminal justice system are to
be accepted as an argument against the existence of speciªc laws, we would have to throw
the entire book of criminal statutes into the dust bin.” Id. However, 6.5% is still more than
six times that of TADA and likely to be signiªcantly higher than POTA as well. See id.;
South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 6, at 31; Sinha &
Chowdhury, supra note 73, ¶ 8 graphic (showing signiªcant disparities between the num-
ber of people accused under POTA and the number of cases tried in court as of March
2003).
181 See Anti-Terrorism Laws, supra note 125, at 4; South Asia Human Rights
Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 10.
182 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15 (India), §§ 3(1)–(3), 21, reprinted in
Thakur, supra note 15, at 10–11, 21–22 (deªning terrorist offenses); Freeman, supra note
39, at 40 (discussing the importance of monitoring the use and abuse of emergency pow-
ers); Tiefenbrun, supra note 136, at 365 (arguing that broad deªnitions of terror invite
political bias).
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was vital to establish some consistency in individual states’ interpreta-
tions and applications of the law.183
Although POTA permitted judicial review, the reviewing state
courts often suffered from local prejudice.184 POTA mentioned the
possibility of both state and central review committees but offered few
details as to their formation or use.185 After a year of allegations of
abuse, the central government ªnally established a review committee to
hear individual POTA cases.186 At ªrst, the committee functioned in a
purely advisory capacity.187 As Tamil Nadu’s case against MDMK minis-
ter Vaiko commenced, the center amended POTA to provide for en-
hanced judicial review.188
In December of 2003, by an overwhelming majority, India’s legisla-
ture amended POTA with an ordinance designed to expand the scope
                                                                                                                     
183 Law Commission of India, § II 1.3–.10, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 56–61
(discussing religious fundamentalist militancy and various other terrorist threats in Jammu
and Kashmir, Punjab, and the northeast); see Sinha & Chowdhury, supra note 73, ¶ 8
graphic (discussing disparities in application of POTA throughout India).
184 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 34, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 31 (pro-
viding that a High Court within the jurisdiction of the Special (POTA) Court may try an
appeal before a bench of two judges); Abuse of the Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 4–
6 (describing court mishandling of habeas corpus petition of Muslims illegally detained in
Gujarat); “We Have No Orders to Save You,” supra note 37, at 6 (alleging local and state gov-
ernmental discrimination against Muslims in Gujarat); Mander, supra note 89, ¶¶ 1–
5 (reporting abuse of POTA against Muslims in Gujarat).
185 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 60, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, 48–49. The
statute provided that the central and state governments “shall, whenever necessary, consti-
tute one or more Review Committees for the purposes of this Act.” Id. § 60(1). A Commit-
tee consisted of a Chairperson and up to three others. Id. § 60(2). The Chairperson was
appointed by the center or state government and had to be or have been a member of a
High Court. Id. § 60(3). Only two provisions of POTA, other than section 60, referred to a
Review Committee. Id. §§ 19(4)–(7), 40; Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶¶ 4, 5.
Section 19 provided that a central government review committee could review a refusal to
remove an organization from the list of illegal terrorist groups and that the Review Com-
mittee’s decision was binding. Prevention of Terrorism Act, §§ 19(4)–(7), reprinted in Tha-
kur, supra note 6, 20–21. Section 40 required that the government submit an approved
application for electronic surveillance to a Review Committee within seven days, but did
not specify whether this would have been a state or central committee. Id. § 40. The pur-
pose of this procedure was “for consideration and approval of the order by the Review
Committee.” Id.
186 See Dhavan, supra note 69, ¶ 6; POTA: Govt. Assurance on Review Panel, Hindu (India),
¶¶ 1, 2 (Mar. 5, 2003), at http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/03/05/stories/
2003030504651100.htm.
187 See Dhavan, supra note 69, ¶ 9; J. Venkatesan, supra note 67, ¶ 5; Reform Without Ra-
tionale, supra note 63, ¶ 4.
188 See Dhavan, supra note 69, ¶¶ 3, 6–7; Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 9.
290 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 25:261
of judicial review.189 The new ordinance gave review commissions the
authority to review the prima facie case of an “aggrieved person” and
issue orders binding on the state government and police.190 Though
the amendment was an improvement on the purely advisory capacity of
the initial review committee because it enhanced the power of judicial
review, the central review committee remained largely impotent, as it
could not initiate an investigation absent an initial complaint and
lacked clearly delineated investigatory powers.191 Moreover, the review
committee’s resources were limited, and it operated under no regu-
lated time-frame.192 Without sufªcient autonomy, resources, or guide-
lines, the committee was an illusory safeguard.193
Given the review committee’s limitations, only the grievances of
those persons with political connections to the central government
were likely to be heard.194 Without MDMK leader Vaiko’s political ties
to the central government, the review committee may never have taken
up his case. 195 Further, even with political pressure from the center and
a favorable advisory opinion by the review committee, Tamil Nadu de-
tained Vaiko for over four months without charge, and an additional
fourteen months after charging him before granting bail.196
If Tamil Nadu had the power to detain a politically-connected per-
son for eighteen months under spurious charges centering on public
speech, indigent children in the more turbulent State of Jharkhand
would almost certainly fare worse.197 A major limitation of any central
review process is that its sheer ability to address abuses of minorities
and the indigent is constrained.198 This problem is simply an unfortu-
                                                                                                                     
189 Lok Sabha Passes Bill to Amend Anti-Terror Law, 1 Indian Dig. 2, ¶¶ 1–2 (Dec. 2003),
at http://www.indianembassy.org/i_digest/2003/dec_02/terror_bill.htm.
190 See Dhavan, supra note 69, ¶ 9; Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 6.
191 See Dhavan, supra note 69, ¶¶ 9–10; Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 12.
192 Dhavan, supra note 69, ¶¶ 9–10; Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 12.
193 See Dhavan, supra note 69, ¶¶ 9–10; Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 12.
194 See Iyer, supra note 131, ¶¶ 3, 9; Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 9.
195 See Iyer, supra note 131, ¶¶ 3, 9; Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 9.
196 See Charge Sheet Filed Against MDMK’s Vaiko, supra note 114, ¶¶ 1, 4; Iyer, supra note
131, ¶¶ 4, 6, 9; Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 9; Vaiko Released from Prison, supra
note 120, ¶ 1.
197 See Charge Sheet Filed Against MDMK’s Vaiko, supra note 114, ¶¶ 1,4; Iyer, supra note
131, ¶¶ 4, 6, 9 (discussing Vaiko’s arrest and detention in Tamil Nadu); Prasad, supra note
18, ¶¶ 5–8, 11 (describing the plight of juveniles and the indigent under POTA in Jhark-
hand); Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 9 (describing political abuse of POTA);
Vaiko Released from Prison, supra note 120, ¶ 1.
198 See Iyer, supra note 131, ¶¶ 3, 9 (asserting that the review process is designed to ad-
dress political abuse rather than abuses like those in Jharkhand); Prasad, supra note 18,
¶¶ 5–8, 11 (describing the predicament of the indigent under POTA in Jharkhand);
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nate reality in a developing country with a population of over one bil-
lion.199 Nevertheless, given adequate resources and open channels of
communication with the media and India’s many human rights groups,
a central review committee could have, at a minimum, investigated a
few of the more egregious cases.200
Even with sufªcient resources, a central review committee is not a
panacea. On the one hand, it may work well to prevent politically mo-
tivated arrests if the accused is an ally of the central government, as
was the case in Tamil Nadu.201 On the other hand, if, as in Uttar
Pradesh or Gujarat, the political climate at the center favors the ac-
cuser, political and communal abuses would likely continue until the
review committee was afforded real autonomy.202 Nevertheless, some
review is better than none at all, especially when national security laws
threaten the inherent checks and balances of coalition politics.203 If
left completely unsupervised, a particular majority party would be
able to detain or silence the opposition and impose harsher and more
                                                                                                                     
Abuse of Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–3, 18 (discussing alleged abuses of Muslim
minority in Gujarat).
199 See World Factbook supra note 26, at 249. The CIA’s 2003 edition of its World
Factbook estimates India’s population at 1,049,700,118 as of 2003. Id. According to the CIA,
“Overpopulation severely handicaps the economy and about a quarter of the population is
too poor to be able to afford an adequate diet.” Id. at 250
200 See U.S. State Dep’t, Country Rep. on Hum. Rts. Practices 251–53 (2003) (re-
porting on activity of several human rights groups in India) [hereinafter Country Rep. on
Hum. Rts. Practices]; Abuse of Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–3, 18 (reporting
alleged POTA abuses in Gujarat and recommending independent review and cooperation
with domestic and international human rights organizations); Dhavan, supra note 69, ¶ 9
(arguing that “[w]ith no powers of investigation and no time frame such committees are a
chimera—-good from far, but far from good”); Prasad, supra note 18, ¶¶ 5–8, 11 (report-
ing on POTA abuses in Jharkhand); Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 12 (arguing
that the Review Committee will be ineffective without state cooperation and timelines de-
cision-making).
201 See Iyer, supra note 131, ¶¶ 3–6, 9; Reform Without Rationale, supra note 63, ¶ 9.
202 See The Current Crisis in South Asia, supra note 4, at 14 (statement of Anatol Lieven,
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) (discussing BJP govern-
ment involvement in Gujarat Riots); Abuse of Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 14–15, 19
(discussing alleged abuses of Muslim minority in Gujarat and arguing for an independent
review committee); Narula, supra note 79, at 44, 50 (citing BJP as head of both central
coalition government and Gujarat government during 2002 riots); Mander, supra note 89,
¶¶ 1–2 (reporting that Indian Home Minister L.K. Advani dismissed claims of government
impropriety in Gujarat); Tripathi, supra note 17, ¶¶ 1, 3–4 (reporting central government
support for Mayawati’s arrest of political opponent).
203 See Freeman, supra note 39, at 41, 43 (describing the role of opposition parties in
checking abuses of power); Iype, supra note 16, ¶¶ 5, 10, 13, 16–19 (discussing use of
POTA against politicians); Moorthy, supra note 110, ¶¶ 1–2, 16–18 (describing Tamil Nadu
Chief Minister J. Jayalalitha’s arrest of political opponent Vaiko under POTA).
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permanent laws than POTA.204 Tyranny, even at the state level, is a
signiªcant threat to liberty and India’s burgeoning democracy.205
V. Lessons for the United States
India’s experiences under POTA are instructive for the United
States and other countries ªghting the war on terror. POTA ªrst
reºects the fact that overbroad deªnitions of terrorism are danger-
ous.206 Deªnitions of terrorism that may include acts of speech and as-
sociation, but do not include an explicit requirement of intent could
encompass innocent activity and curtail the political process.207 No rea-
sonable government would support an extremist who “advocates,” “in-
cites,” or “invites support for” terrorists. Including those terms in anti-
terrorism legislation, however, gives zealots within the government a
loaded weapon against those with whom they simply disagree.208 Simi-
larly, President George W. Bush’s declaration “[e]ither you are with us,
or you are with the terrorists” bodes ominously for political protesters
in the United States whose activities might fall within the PATRIOT
Act’s broad deªnition of terrorism.209
Second, POTA’s application provides insight into the hazards that
anti-terror laws pose when implemented. India’s experience suggests
that taking legislative shortcuts around safeguards designed to prevent
arbitrary arrest and detention often result in precisely those arbitrary
practices.210 Although this outcome may initially seem like a reasonable,
                                                                                                                     
204 See Freeman, supra note 39, at 41.
205 Id.
206 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15 (India), §§ 3, 21, 49(2), reprinted in
Thakur, supra note 6, at 10–12, 21, 43–44 (providing broad deªnitions of terrorist of-
fenses and prolonged detention); Abuse of the Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–2.
207 See Tiefenbrun, supra note 136, at 365, 380; Iyer, supra note 131, ¶ 10.
208 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, §§ 3(1), (3), 21(1), (3), reprinted in Thakur, supra
note 6, at 10–11, 21–22; see Moorthy, supra note 110, ¶¶ 1, 2 (reporting on a politician
arrested in Tamil Nadu for allegedly giving a speech in support of a dissident group).
209 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the Ameri-
can People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/
09/20010920–8.htm; see 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2003). The PATRIOT Act’s deªnition of
terrorism includes already criminalized “violent acts or acts dangerous to human life” that
“appear to be intended” to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population” or “to inºuence the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2003).
210 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 49(2), (6)–(7), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6,
at 43–45 (permitting up to 180 days detention without charge and denial of bail without
evidence of innocence); Abuse of the Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–2 (discussing
arbitrary and abusive detention of Muslim minorities in Gujarat); South Asia Human
Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 87, 89 (discussing POTO’s effect on
length of detention and bail proceedings and the constitutional guarantee of a speedy
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if not inevitable, compromise, when police arrest, detain, and abuse
hundreds of minorities on unsubstantiated grounds, respect for the
rule of law suffers.211
Due in part to the decentralization of the anti-terror laws’ en-
forcement in India, law enforcement ofªcers have applied such laws
differently from state to state.212 When governments do not apply anti-
terror laws even-handedly or consistently, they invite harsh criticism, if
not violent reprisals.213 For example, in Gujarat, only Muslims were
subject to POTA, a practice that likely helped violence to endure be-
yond the 2002 pogroms.214 In other Indian states, such as Kashmir,
Jarkhand, or Tamil Nadu, prolonged repression under anti-terror laws
has led to similar cycles of continually escalating violence.215
India’s practice of subjecting ethnic and political minorities to un-
fair treatment out of a fear of terrorism is not an isolated one. Like In-
dia, the United States previously has detained thousands of innocent
people in the name of national security.216 During the 1920 Palmer
Raids, the United States arrested 6,000 suspected Communist radicals
in response to a series of terrorist bombings.217 Thirty years later, dur-
                                                                                                                     
trial); Sinha & Chowdhury, supra note 73, ¶ 8 graphic (reporting widespread and inconsis-
tent use of POTA across India).
211 See Freeman, supra note 39, at 11–12, 38–39.
212 See Abuse of the Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 1–2 (discussing arbitrary and
abusive detention of Muslim minorities in Gujarat); Sinha & Chowdhury, supra note 73,
¶ 8 graphic (showing widespread and inconsistent use of POTA across India).
213 See The Current Crisis in South Asia, supra note 4, at 13 (statement of Anatol Lieven,
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) (arguing that “ruthless re-
pression by the Indian armed forces . . . fueled the growth of Kashmiri extremism and mili-
tancy and led to a cycle of violence both by Indian security forces and by the Kashmirian [sic]
militants”); Freeman, supra note 39, at 189 (asserting that harsh U.K. detention laws bol-
stered support for the Irish Republican Army); Abuse of Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at
3–4 (criticizing POTA’s exclusive application to Muslims following the riots in Gujarat).
214 See Abuse of Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 3–4 (discussing POTA’s exclusive
application to Muslims following the riots in Gujarat).
215 See The Current Crisis in South Asia, supra note 4, at 13 (statement of Anatol Lieven,
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) (arguing that “ruthless
repression by the Indian armed forces . . . fueled the growth of Kashmiri extremism and
militancy and led to a cycle of violence both by Indian security forces and by the
Kashmirian [sic] militants”); Law Commission of India, § II 1.5–.9, reprinted in Thakur,
supra note 6, at 58–60 (citing terrorist violence in Jarkhand and surrounding areas); 2001
Patterns of Global Terrorism, supra note 6, at 10–11 (discussing terrorist threats in
India); Jain, supra note 3, ¶ 1 (discussing the Tamil Tigers).
216 See Alan Brinkley, A Familiar Story: Lessons from Past Assaults on Freedoms, in The War
on Our Freedoms, supra note 121, at 30–31.
217 Id. Many remained in custody for weeks or months without formal charges and
were denied access to attorneys or family members. Id. Most were not radicals or law-
breakers and were eventually released. Id. The crackdown, intended to reveal and destroy
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ing World War II, the U.S. military interned over 100,000 people of
Japanese ancestry in California, fearing that a subset were disloyal.218
After September 11, the United States has again taken extreme
measures to assuage its fears. Although the USA PATRIOT Act does
not alter criminal procedure in the manner of POTA, it grants immi-
gration ofªcials broad powers to detain non-U.S. citizens.219 As of
2003, the government had detained almost 1,200 men of mostly Arab
and South Asian descent for immigration infractions, and refused to
disclose any information about them, including their names.220 Many
were held for weeks or months without charge.221
More harassment of noncitizens and ethnic minorities may be
forthcoming. In July 2003, the House of Representatives proposed the
                                                                                                                     
an alleged national, revolutionary conspiracy only netted three pistols and a small amount
of radical literature. Id.
218 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1449 (W.D. Wash. 1986); Brinkley,
supra note 216, at 40. Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense
Command, suspected some Japanese and Japanese Americans of being disloyal. See Hirabayashi,
627 F. Supp. at 1449; Brinkley, supra note 216, at 40. At the time, the Supreme Court deferred to
the military’s justiªcation of urgent necessity, which precluded individual loyalty hearings. See
Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1454, 1455–56. Subsequent evidence proved that urgency was
merely a pretext for General DeWitt’s personal prejudice. See id. at 1456. In a telephone conver-
sation between General DeWitt and another ofªcer regarding loyalty hearings, General DeWitt
asserted that “[t]here isn’t such a thing as a loyal Japanese and it is just impossible to determine
their loyalty by investigation—it just can’t be done . . . .” Id. at 1452. Presidents Gerald Ford,
Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton all denounced the internment and issued apologies to Japa-
nese Americans. See Mary Buckley & Rick Fawn, The War on Terror: International Implications, in
Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond 311–12 (Mary Buckley &
Rick Fawn eds., 2003).
219 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1), (3), (6) (2003). If the Attorney General has “reasonable
grounds to believe” that “an alien is engaged in any . . . activity that endangers the national se-
curity of the United States” or is deportable in any other way, the Attorney General may remove
that person or detain him or her for consecutive six-month periods so long as the person is
considered a threat to any person or the community. Id.
220 See Leone, supra note 122, at 9. While this approach might yield nuggets of intelligence
and even frustrate some attacks, it is unlikely to isolate and neutralize Al Qaeda in the United
States given the group’s expansive international network. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F.
Supp. 2d 42, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (arguing that prolonged detention can elicit information from
detainees); Freeman, supra note 39, at 189 (arguing that emergency powers are likely to be
effective where “the state can move quickly against a small and weakly supported terrorist
group”); Andrew Tan, The New Terrorism: Implications and Strategies, in The New Terrorism:
Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies 234 (Andrew Tan & Kumar Ramakrishna eds.,
2002) (discussing the emergence of an international terrorist network which could replenish
itself indeªnitely); Buckley & Fawn, supra note 218, at 312–13 (discussing the detention of over
1,200 noncitizens, the need for intelligence, the threat of ethnic harassment to democratic
tradition, and the need for international cooperation).
221 Leone, supra note 122, at 9.
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Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act.222
The Act would grant to state and local law enforcement ofªcials the
ability to investigate, detain, or remove undocumented aliens; states
and localities failing to participate would be denied some of their fed-
eral funding.223 Supporters claim that the Act will combat terrorism by
improving coordination among federal, state, and local ofªcials.224
Critics dispute this assertion and argue that the CLEAR Act is an un-
funded mandate that will hamper community policing and encourage
racial proªling.225 Furthermore, without proper training or guidance,
local law enforcement might misapply complex federal immigration
laws and inject local bias into the process.226 India’s experience with
POTA illustrates the risks of granting state and local authorities broad
authority to enforce laws that are essentially federal in nature.227 In
light of India’s experience and the well-reasoned criticism voiced on
Capital Hill, Congress should not pass the CLEAR Act.228
Third, India’s experience under POTA demonstrates the need
for minimal transparency and review for the protection of those de-
tained under severe and secretive anti-terror laws. Although POTA
did not deprive Gujarat detainees of all procedural rights, some law
enforcement and judicial ofªcers ignored the few rights that prison-
ers retained.229 Such deprivations of rights led to India’s realization
                                                                                                                     
222 H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query
(last visited Sept. 4, 2004).
223 H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. §§ 101–02; House Subcommittee Debates Local Enforcement of
Immigration Laws Under Proposed CLEAR Act, 80 Interpreter Releases 1407 (Oct. 13,
2003) [hereinafter House Subcommittee Debates Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws].
224 House Subcommittee Debates Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws, supra note 223, at
1408–10.
225 See House Subcommittee Debates Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws, supra note 223, at
1410; American Civil Liberties Union, Statement on H.R. 2671, the “Clear Law Enforcement for
Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act of 2003” Before the House Subcommittee on Immigration,
Border Security and Claims, ¶ 5 (Oct. 1, 2003), at http://www.aclu.org/ImmigrantsRights/
ImmigrantsRights.cfm?ID=13881&c=22.
226 See House Subcommittee Debates Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Under Proposed
CLEAR Act, supra note 223, at 1410; American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 225, ¶ 8.
227 See Law Commission of India, § II 1.1–.10, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 56–
61 (discussing Indian central government proposal for law that precipitated POTA to ad-
dress pan-Indian terror threat); Sinha & Chowdhury, supra note 73, ¶ 8 graphic (depicting
widespread and varied application of POTA throughout seven Indian states).
228 See House Subcommittee Debates Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws, supra note 223, at
1410; American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 225, ¶ 5.
229 See Abuse of the Law in Gujarat, supra note 16, at 4–6 (describing court mishan-
dling of habeas corpus petition of Muslims illegally detained in Gujarat). Amnesty Interna-
tional received numerous reports of illegal detentions, torture, and irregular police work
in Gujarat. See id. at 1–2, 6, 11.
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that an active and empowered central review process is necessary to
remedy such injustices.230
In the United States, a court of review for foreign intelligence
surveillance activity exists under the PATRIOT Act.231 Some anti-
terror activity, however, occurs by executive ªat, and thus lacks legisla-
tive supervision or meaningful judicial review.232 For example, the ex-
ecutive branch has suspended unilaterally the due process rights of at
least one U.S. citizen seized on U.S. soil.233 In 2002, Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld alleged that Jose Padilla, a.k.a. Abdullah Al
Muhajir, planned attacks in the United States and was associated with
Al Qaeda.234 Rumsfeld argued that his allegations qualiªed Padilla as
an “enemy combatant” not entitled to ordinary due process rights.235
The government has held Padilla in solitary conªnement, without
charge or access to counsel for over twenty-one months, and asserts
that it has the right to detain Padilla incommunicado indeªnitely.236
U.S. policymakers might be inclined to limit the lessons of POTA
to India’s peculiar geopolitical context. India admittedly has had a
more turbulent history of terrorism and harsher anti-terror laws than
the United States.237 Its parliamentary democracy also possesses weaker
                                                                                                                     
230 See Country Rep. on Hum. Rts. Practices, supra note 200, at 251–53 (reporting
on activity of several human rights groups in India); Abuse of Law in Gujarat, supra note
16 at 1–3, 18 (reporting alleged POTA abuses in Gujarat and recommending independent
review and cooperation with domestic and international human rights organizations);
Dhavan, supra note 69, ¶ 9 (arguing that “[w]ith no powers of investigation and no time
frame such committees are a chimera—good from far, but far from good.”); Prasad, supra
note 18, ¶¶ 5–8, 11 (reporting on POTA abuses in Jharkhand); Reform Without Rationale,
supra note 63, ¶ 12 (arguing that the Review Committee will be ineffective without state
cooperation and timelines decision-making).
231 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, No. 02-001, (U.S. Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. Nov. 18,
2002).
232 See Anthony Lewis, Security and Liberty: Preserving the Values of Freedom, in The War on
Our Freedoms, supra note 121, at 52–54.
233 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699–700 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds,
124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715–17 (2004); Lewis, supra note 232, at 52–54.
234 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700.
235 See id.
236 See id. at 700, 710.
237 See generally USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (not altering
criminal penalties or authorizing detention without charge); Prevention of Terrorism Act,
2002, Act No. 15 (India), §§ 29, 49, 53, reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6, at 27–28, 43–44,
46–47; South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, supra note 8, at 5–9 (citing
broad terrorist offenses based on speech and association, presumptions of guilt based on
certain evidence, special anti-terror courts, trials in absentia, detention without charge for
up to 180 days, and severe bail restrictions); Law Commission of India, § II 1.3–.10, re-
printed in Thakur, supra note 6, at 56–61 (discussing religious fundamentalist militancy
and various other terrorist threats in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and the northeast).
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separation of powers than the U.S. federal government.238 Moreover,
India is a developing nation with a population over three times that of
the United States but enjoying far fewer resources.239 Despite these dif-
ferences, however, India and the United States share worrying com-
monalities in their approaches to terrorism and national security.
India’s experience under POTA and its previous laws should
serve as a warning to the United States that it may have embarked on
a perilous path toward arbitrary detention and government oppres-
sion. Padilla is just one man, but his detention, combined with the
severe crackdown on noncitizens within the United States signiªes the
shifting of U.S. national security policy in a new and dangerous direc-
tion.240 Following the events of September 11, law enforcement
ofªcials have spied on mosques and engaged in other sorts of racial,
ethnic, and religious proªling.241 The United States has detained
people out of racial and political prejudice in the past.242 Detaining
more Arab Americans, South Asian Americans, or Muslim Americans
as enemy combatants may be the next step in the domestic war on
terror.243 In the United States, where the executive operates with se-
crecy and the Arab, South Asian, and Muslim minorities are smaller
than those in India, such abuses may go unnoticed.244
                                                                                                                     
238 See Freeman, supra note 39, at 37 (describing parliamentary democracies as having
weaker separation of powers than the U.S. system).
239 See World Factbook, supra note 26, at 249, 561. The CIA estimates that the United
States’ current population is approximately 290 million, while India’s is approximately
1.04 billion. Id. The U.S. budget revenue is forty times that of India’s. Id. at 250, 563.
240 See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 724 (holding that the executive may not detain a U.S. citizen
seized within the United States without explicit authorization from Congress and ordering
Padilla’s release upon a writ of habeas corpus from the District Court); Lewis, supra note
232, at 54 (arguing that “[w]hat was done in the case of Jose Padilla made a radical change
in our assumptions about the limits on government power.”).
241 See Edley, Jr., supra note 121, at 173–74 (discussing proªling based on race, religion,
and nationality in investigations and immigration procedures); Isikoff, supra note 121, at 6
(discussing FBI inventory of mosques for counter-terrorism investigations).
242 See Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1449, 1454 (discussing the detention of over 100,000
people of Japanese ancestry in California under false pretenses during World War II);
Brinkley, supra note 209, at 30, 40 (describing the detention of 6,000 suspected radicals in
1920 and the internment of over 100,000 people of Japanese descent during World War
II).
243 See Edley, Jr., supra note 121, at 189 (arguing that the United States has “begun to
slide down a slippery slope” that may lead to detention based on prejudice against immi-
grants and minorities).
244 See U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (observing that the
discrete and insular minorities are vulnerable to prejudice in the democratic political pro-
cess); World Factbook, supra note 26, at 249, 562 (estimating India’s Muslim minority at
twelve percent and including the U.S. Muslim minority within the category of “other” at
less than four percent); Edley, Jr., supra note 121, at 188–89 (arguing that government
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The United States need not repeat India’s mistakes. One way to
avoid similar problems would be to narrow deªnitions of terrorism
and explicitly require intent in harsh anti-terror laws.245 Legislators
must also guard against laws that permit detention without charge.246
Furthermore, Congress and immigration ofªcers should ensure that
minor immigration violations do not result in unreasonably long de-
tentions.247 To promote consistency in a climate of widespread fear,
only federal ofªcers should have the power to enforce immigration
laws, which make it easy to detain noncitizens.248 Finally, federal
courts should ensure that the writ of habeas corpus remains a viable
check on executive authority, especially in times of war.249
                                                                                                                     
secrecy conceals the extent and purpose of racial proªling, impairs independent analysis,
and undermines restraint and reform).
245 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2003) (broadly deªning terrorism); Tiefenbrun, supra
note 136, at 365, 380 (discussing the element of intent in anti-terror laws). The PATRIOT
Act’s deªnition of terrorism could easily be read to encompass a wide range of ordinary
criminal acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).
246 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 49(2), (6)–(7), reprinted in Thakur, supra note 6,
at 43–45 (permitting detention without charge); Abuse of the Law in Gujarat, supra
note 16, at 1–2 (discussing arbitrary and abusive detention of Muslim minorities in Gu-
jarat).
247 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2003) (permitting lengthy detentions of noncitizens for a
wide range of immigration violations); Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 49(2), (6)–(7), re-
printed in Thakur, supra note 6, at 43–45 (permitting up to 180 days detention without
charge and denial of bail without evidence of innocence); Abuse of the Law in Gujarat,
supra note 16, at 1–2 (discussing prolonged detentions of Muslim minorities in Gujarat);
Leone, supra note 122, at 9 (discussing the prolonged detention of over one thousand
Muslims and South Asians in the United States following the September 11 attacks).
248 See H.R. 2671, 108th Cong., §§ 101–02 (proposing to grant state and local law en-
forcement ofªcers authority to enforce federal immigration laws); House Subcommittee De-
bates Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Under Proposed CLEAR Act, supra note 223, at 1410
(citing lawmakers’ concerns that local enforcement of immigration laws will be biased);
American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 225, ¶ 8 (criticizing proposed law granting
local law enforcement ofªcers authority to enforce federal immigration laws); Sinha &
Chowdhury, supra note 73, ¶ 8 graphic (reporting widespread and inconsistent use of
POTA across India).
249 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699–700 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds,
124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715–17 (2004). Jose Padilla invoked the writ of habeas corpus to chal-
lenge his detention as an enemy combatant. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2715. While the Second
Circuit found his detention to be improper, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 2717, 2727. The Court held that the proper defen-
dant in the case was the warden at the naval brig in South Carolina wherein Padilla was
held, rather than Donald Rumsfeld, thus the federal courts in New York had no jurisdic-
tion to hear the case. Id. at 2727. While the Supreme Court’s ruling is not fatal to the writ
of habeas corpus, it illustrates the technical difªculties that detainees face when seeking
redress. See id.
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Conclusion
The United States has been waging war on terrorists since Sep-
tember 11, 2001. India has been waging that war for over ªfty years,
and has learned a great deal from its successes and failures. No politi-
cian since Indira Gandhi has suspended the constitution. After heavy-
handed action within Punjab, the Indian military now ªghts its largest
anti-terror battles at the border. TADA’s widespread abuse and un-
popularity instructed legislators to include enhanced safeguards in
POTA. Abuses persist, however, and the learning must continue. India
must continue to reªne broad deªnitions of terrorist offenses and
guard against arbitrary detentions motivated by politics, prejudice, or
haste. In this regard, the world’s largest democracy and the world’s
richest have much in common. India’s lessons are America’s lessons,
too. For students of the war on terror, the classroom has no walls.
